Document Numbers 446-475


1-2 August
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No. 446.
Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir Edward Grey.
58, Cadogan Gardens, S.W.,
August 1, 1914.(1)

Sir Edward Grey,
I presume you have received the enclosed telegram.(2) The action of Germany clearly constitutes her the aggressor, and in these circumstances there should be no hesitation as to our attitude. I am sure that the country would fully endorse when the facts are stated our coming to the aid of our friends. I have also little doubt that the opposition leaders in this case would, if consulted, be of the same mind.

We should mobilise to-day so that our expeditionary force may be on its way during next week. Should we waver now we shall rue the day later.

(1) This is the date in Sir A. Nicolson's own writing; clearly it is a mistake for August 2.
(2) No. 473.

(35569) No. 447.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.
(No. 518.) Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

Sir,
M. Cambon to-day, in the conversation that is partially recorded in my telegram No. 299 of the 1st August,(1) urged upon me very strongly our obligation to help France if she was attacked by Germany. He even said that, for the sake of public opinion in England, France had drawn her forces back from her German frontier, so that she was now in a position to take only the defensive, and not the offensive, against Germany. She had concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean and had left her northern and western coasts exposed.

I said that, as long as we did not give Germany any promise of our neutrality and as a matter of fact we had hitherto definitely refused to give such a promise the French might be sure that the German fleet would not pass through the channel, for fear that we should take the opportunity of intervening, when the German fleet would be at our mercy. I promised, however, to see whether we could give any assurance that, in such circumstances, we would intervene.

As to the question of our obligation to help France, I pointed out that we had no obligation. France did not wish to join in the war that seemed about to break out, but she was obliged to join in it, because of her alliance. We had purposely kept clear of all alliances, in order that we might not be involved in difficulties in this way. I had assured Parliament again and again that our hands were free. It was most unreasonable to say that, because France had an obligation under an alliance of which we did not even know the terms, therefore we were bound equally with her, by the obligation in that alliance, to be involved in war.

M. Cambon admitted that there was no obligation of this kind, but he urged very strongly the obligation of British interests. If we did not help France, the entente would disappear; and, whether victory came to Germany or to France and Russia, our situation at the end of the war would be very uncomfortable.

I admitted the force of this, but I said that it was for us to consider the point of what British interests required, and to deal with it in Parliament. I was aware that very grave considerations were involved.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

(1) No. 426.

(35568) No. 448.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.
(No. 256.)
Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

Sir,
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium affected feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which had been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country. I said that we had been discussing this question at a Cabinet meeting, and, as I was authorised to tell him this, I gave him an aide-mémoire of it.

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral.

I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.

I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Published in BB No. 123.

Enclosure in No. 448.
Memorandum.
The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If Germany could see her way to give the same assurance as that which has been given by France it would materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension here. On the other hand, if there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.

Foreign Office, August 1, 1914.

(The File Copy is marked Not sent War.")
For Prince Lichnowsky's account of this conversation aee DD No. 596.
Cf. also No. 419.

No. 449.
Sir F. Bertie to Sir E. Grey.
Paris, August 1, 1914.

My dear Grey,
The American Ambassador tells me that if there be war which he thinks certainty the American Embassy is to have charge of German interests and he believe that the American Embassy at Berlin will have charge of French interests. The German Ambassador is still here but the American Ambassador expects him to leave.

Yours sincerely,
FRANCIS BERTIE.

(35337) No. 450.
Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.
Vienna, August 1, 1914.
D. August 1, 3:50 P.M.
Tel. (No. 138.)
R. August 2, 1 A.M.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will receive me to-morrow. He will see the Russian and French Ambassadors this afternoon. The Russian Ambassador has just called to tell me of the German ultimatum requiring Russia, within twelve hours, to say she will demobilise. Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs asked the German Ambassador if the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war. The German Ambassador answered that it would (group omitted: ? force) Germany to mobilise. The Russian Ambassador at Vienna says that the so-called complete mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than the taking by Russia of corresponding military precautions to those taken by Germany. He thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that Germany will attack Russia immediately, as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept up long. Tension between Russia and Germany seems greater even than that between Russia and Austria. The Russian Ambassador says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria, and would be satisfied even now with assurance as to the independence and integrity of Servia. His Excellency will again point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day that refusal to make this slight concession must entail most terrific consequences. Russia would fight this time to the last extremity.

He is convinced that Germany desired war from the first. I agree that the German Ambassador at Vienna did, and that his action here has probably been coloured by his strong personal bias.

French Ambassador intends to ask Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered, and speak earnestly on the extreme danger of the situation. I fear that nothing can alter determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course if they have made up their minds, with Germany behind them. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I reply always that no one can say, but England cannot be expected to abandon her friends.

Published in BB No. 141 (paraphrased last sentence omitted).

(35317) No. 451.
Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.
Paris, August 1, 1914.
D. August 1, 9:30 P.M.
Tel. (No. 115.)
R. August 2, 2:15 A.M.

Naval attaché reports following information from Ministry of Marine:

"The Chief of the General Staff reports that the whole of the French fleet is ready in every respect for any eventualities. Battleships "France" and "Parisien" will be ready to join the fleet on 15th August."

(35316) No. 452.
Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.
Paris, August 1, 1914.
D. August 1, 9:30 A.M.
Tel. (No. 114.)
R. August 2, 8 A.M
.

Military attaché reports that the Minister of War sent for him again this evening at 8 o'clock. Minister of War stated that he wished to keep him informed on the situation. He told him that there were eight German army corps opposed to French, but real object of interview was evidently to convey Minister's opinion as follows:

That there is only one way of securing peace, which is for England to act militarily instead of diplomatically. Military attach‚ assured him that England was doing her utmost to ensure peace. Minister of War laid great stress on the fact that the 10-kilom. zone which he had arranged between French troops and German frontier was a proof of French endeavour to commit no provocative act. This zone is still occupied by peasants.

Published in BB No. 140 (paraphrased part omitted).

(35318) No. 453.
Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.
Paris, August 1, 1914.
D. August 2, 1:15 A.M.
Tel. (No. 116.)
R. August 2, 4:30 A.M.

August 1, midnight. The war. Your telegram No. 297 of this evening.(1)

Do you desire me to state to French Government that after mobilisation of French and German troops on Franco-German frontier we propose to remain neutral so long as German troops remain on the defensive and do not cross French frontier, and French abstain from crossing German frontier? I cannot imagine that in the event of Russia being at war with Austria and being attacked by Germany it would be consistent with French obligations towards Russia for French to remain quiescent. If French undertook to remain so, the Germans would first attack Russians and, if they defeated them, they would then turn round on the French.

Am I to enquire precisely what are the obligations of the French under Franco-Russian Alliance?

See No. 460.

(1) No. 419.

(35320) No. 454.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.
St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.
D. (From Aden)(1) August 2, 5 A.M.
Tel. (No. 198.)
R. 3:25 A.M.

Following from military attaché for War Office:

"Mobilisation proceeding smoothly including horse conscription. All fifteen classes of reservists taken in St. Petersburg. In Moscow and Kieff 1910 to 1918 classes. Ban of Opolchenie taken in addition, but not here as yet. Reported that 200,000 reservists taken in Petersburg.

"Finland declared in a state of war and placed under Commander of Petersburg district for civil and military government.

"Notices posted calling for labourers to cut down trees and dig trenches near Petersburg. Reported that 50,000 men required to construct defences at Oranienbaum and Sestrerets (sic ? Sestrorjezk).

"Reported that transport of reservists to Finland commenced on 25th July.

"Reported that Emperor will command with Minister of War as Chief of Staff. Grand Duke Nicholas to command against Austria.

"All Guard Corps to go to west.

"Cholera increasing at Kamenets Podolsk."

(1) Owing to uncertainty and delays in the other routes the alternative route viâ Aden was used from this date.

(35332) No. 455.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.
Berlin, July 31, 1914.
D. July 81, 5:38 P.M.
Tel. (No. 112.)
R. August 2, 5:30 A.M.

My French Colleague informs me that he was told by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this afternoon that the Imperial Government had instructed the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to ask the Russian Government to countermand order for mobilisation against Germany.

(This telegram took 36 hours to come through. G. R. C., 2/8/14.)

(35884) No. 456.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.
(a.)
Berlin, August 1, 1914.
D. August 2, 1 .A.M.
Tel. (No. 120.)
R. August 2, 5:45 A.M.

Detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg.

Your telegram of 1st August(1) acted on.

Secretary of State, who expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, has promised to send orders at once to allow steamers to proceed without delay.

Published in BB No. 148.
Cf. Nos. 496 and 677.

(1) No. 402.

(35366) (b)
Berlin, .August 2, 1914.
D. 11:30 A.M.
Tel. (No. 123.)
R. 11 55 A.M.

My telegram of 1st August.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that orders were sent last night to allow British ships in Hamburg to proceed on their way. He says that this must be regarded as a special favour to His Majesty's Government, as no other foreign ships have been allowed to leave. Reason of detention was that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken.

Published in BB No. 145.

(35333) No. 457.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.
Berlin, August 1, 1914.
D. August 1, 8:45 P.M.
Tel. (No. 119.)
R. August 2, 6 A.M
.

Order for general mobilisation of army and navy has just been issued. August 2nd first day of mobilisation.

Published in BB No. 142 (paraphrased).

(35335) No. 458.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.
Berlin, August 1, 1914.
D. August 2, 1:32 A.M.
Tel. (No. 121.)
R. August 2, 6:30 A.M.

Your telegram No. 250 of 1st August.(1)

I have communicated the substance of the above telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and spent a long time arguing with him that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. If, therefore, Austria and Russia were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters and Germany did not desire war on her own account, it seemed to me only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and had not Russia mobilised against Germany, all would have been well. But Russia [two groups undecypherable] abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise had caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. This was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now was that, though the Imperial Government had allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia had sent no answer. Germany had therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German representative at St. Petersburg had been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard their refusal to answer as creating a state of war.

Published in BB No. 138.

(1) No. 411.

(35319) No. 459.
Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.
St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.
D. August 2, 7:30 A.M.
Tel. (No. 195.)
R. August 2, 8:40 A.M.

My telegram No. 193 of 31st July.(1)

At audience accorded yesterday Emperor read German Ambassador his telegram to German Emperor, and matters were in no way advanced.

Austrian Ambassador saw Minister for Foreign Affairs in the evening, but had no precise instructions. He tried to turn conversation away from Servian question to that of general relations between Russia and Austria. Minister for Foreign Affairs said that these relations, taken by themselves, were perfectly good, and he desired to keep them on friendly footing. Question at present at issue was whether Servia was to be left free and independent, or whether she was to be crushed and made vassal of Austria. It was useless to talk about Austrian and Russian relations in the abstract while this issue of the question remained unsettled. London was only place where a discussion could take place with any hope of success, but Austria was doing her best to render all discussion impossible by bombarding Belgrade, which was virtually an unfortified town.(2)

In informing French Ambassador and myself of the above this morning, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that during Balkan crisis he had told Austria that attack on Servia meant war with Russia. Russia could no more consent to Servia becoming a vassal of Austria than Great Britain could to Holland being made a dependency of Germany. It was a vital question for Russia. Austria had throughout pursued a tortuous and immoral policy, and, having secured Germany's support, thought she could defy Russia. Germany's attitude had been equivocal and double-faced, and whether she was or not cognisant of terms of ultimatum, she had deferred intervening at Vienna till psychological moment had passed. She had, unfortunately, been represented at St. Petersburg by an Ambassador who had reported that Russia would never fight, and at Vienna by one who was violently anti-Russian, and who had encouraged Austrian action.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had worn himself out in his endeavours to avoid a conflict. He had caught at every suggestion held out conference of four, Anglo-Italian mediation, and direct conversation between St. Petersburg and Vienna but Germany and Austria had either negatived or returned such evasive answers as to render them ineffective. He could do no more unless a precise and plain issue were made subject of discussion. Austria's action and Germany's preparations had forced Russia to mobilise, and now that Germany was also mobilising, situation was desperate. He had forwarded to Vienna formula recorded in my telegram No. 193,(1) and he still held to it if you could get it accepted before German troops crossed frontier. Russia, in any case, would not be first to commence hostilities.

There now seems to be no chance of averting a general war unless Germany and France would agree, as Russia is ready to do, to keep their troops mobilised on their own side of frontier pending final attempt to arrive at settlement. Russia is anxiously waiting to know whether Great Britain will support her in a war which has been forced on her, as its duration and its issue depend on our co-operating with her and France from the commencement.

Roumanian Minister told me this morning that if war broke out Turkey and Bulgaria were almost certain to join forces against Greece and Servia, and that Balkans, as well as Europe, would be in a blaze. I gathered from his language that Roumania is more likely to confine her attention to the Balkans than give active Resistance to Austria.

I communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning the substance of your telegram No. 413 of 31st July.(3)

(Penultimate paragraph repeated to Bucharest No. 11, Sophia No. 18, Athens No. 105 and Constantinople No. 331.)

Published in BB No. 139 (paraphrased parts omitted).

(1) No. 393.
(2) See A III No. 97.
(3) No. 335.

(35318) No. 460.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.
Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.
Tel. (No. 301.)
D. 10 50 A.M.

Your telegram No. 116 of 1st August ;(1) The war.

No action required now on my telegram No. 297 of 1st August.(2)

(1) No. 453.
(2) No. 419.

(35352) No. 461.
Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.
Berlin, August 2, 1914.
D. 11:30 A.M.
Tel. (No. 122.)
R. 11 A.M.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has just informed me that, owing to certain Russian troops having crossed frontier, Germany and Russia are now as in a state of war.

Published in BB No. 144.

(35350) No. 462.
Mr. Chilton to Sir Edward Grey.
(a.)
The Hague, August 2, 1914.
D. 10:20 A.M.
Tel. (No. 22) En clair.
R. 11:1 A.M.

Notice issued in "Official Gazette" to-day stating Northern Estuaries and Goeree Estuary rendered unsafe by mines and mine-laying vessels ready to close all other estuaries immediately they receive the order

(35351) (b.)
The Hague, August 2, 1914.
D. 9:20 A.M.
Tel. (No. 23.) En clair.
R. 11:7 A.M.

Royal Decrees issued prohibiting export of horses, hay, straw, oats, coal and coke.

(35331) No. 463.
Sir Edward Grey to Sir M. de Bunsen.
Foreign Office, August 2, 1914.
Tel. (No. 202.)
D. 11:25 A.M.

The war. Ask Government to give immediate order to allow a train to approach Belgrade under white flag to convey away British subjects and other non-combatants.

Cf. No. 435.

(35360) No. 464.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.
Peking, August 2, 1914.
D. 12:50 P.M.
Tel. (No 141.)
R. 11:40 A.M.

Following from consular officer at Harbin, dated August 12th (sic):

"Orders telegraphed last night for mobilisation, which has already commenced, of all Russian troops in railway area. Orders embrace all reservists and militia. Movements of trains entirely altered, expresses discontinued and no goods accepted. Whole line is being made ready for transport of troops and all military emergencies."

(35358) No. 465.
Sir F. Villiers to Sir Edward Grey.
Brussels, August 2, 1914.
D.:10 50 A.M.
Tel. (No. 9.)
R. 11:45 A.M.

Belgian Government have official confirmation of news that a German force entered Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

Published in BB No. 146 (paraphrased).

(35349) No. 466.
Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 2.)
Télégraphique.
Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914.

J'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants: Dimanche 2 août de grand matin, les troupes allemandes, d'après les informations qui sont parvenues au Gouvernement Grand-Ducal à l'heure actuelle, ont pénétr‚ sur le territoire luxembourgeois par les ponts de Wasserbillig et de Remich, se dirigeant spécialement vers le sud du pays et vers la ville de Luxembourg, capitale du Grand-Duché. Un certain nombre de trains blindés avec des troupes et des munitions ont été acheminés par la voie de chemin de fer de Wasserbillig à Luxembourg, où l'on s'attend de les voir arriver. D'un instant à l'autre, ces faits impliquent des actes manifestement contraires à la neutralité du Grand-Duché, garantie par le Trait‚ de Londres de 1867. Le Gouvernement luxembourgeois n'a pas manqué de protester énergiquement contre cette agression aupr`s des représentants de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne à Luxembourg. Une protestation identique va être transmise télégraphiquement au Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères à Berlin.

Ministre d'état, Président du Gouvernement,
EYSCHEN.

Published with translation in BB No. 147.
Cf. F No. 131.

(35447) No. 467.
Minister of State, Luxemburg, to Sir Edward Grey. (Received August 2.)
Télégraphique.
Luxembourg, le 2 août, 1914

La dépêche suivante vient de parvenir du soussigné, Ministre d'état, Président du Gouvernement de Luxembourg:

"Les mesures militaires sont devenues inévitables, à notre plus grand regret, cela par le fait que nous avons de nouvelles certaines d'après lesquelles les troupes françaises sont en marche sur Luxembourg. Nous dû [sic] prendre des mesures pour la protection de notre armée et la sûreté des voies ferrées. Il n'y a de notre part aucune intention de poser un acte hostile contre le Luxembourg ami en présence du péril imminent; nous n'avions malheureusement plus le temps d'en aviser préalablement le Gouvernement luxembourgeois. Le Gouvernement Impérial garantit au Luxembourg une complète indemnisation pour les dommages causés. -- JAGOW."

EYSCHEN.

(35355) No. 468.
Consul Le Gallais to Sir Edward Grey.
Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.
Tel. En clair.
R. August 2
.

German troops have entered south of Grand Duchy. Armed train arrived station of Luxemburg.

(35452) No. 469.
Acting British Consul (Luderitzbucht) to Sir Edward Grey.
Luderitzbucht, August 2, 1914.

Trains with commissariat supplies and coal have been forwarded continuously to interior. Bank stopped regular payments. Rise in food prices 20 per cent. Great excitement prevails throughout the country.

(35553) No. 470.
Communication from Netherlands Minister.
August 2, 1914.

The Netherlands Minister called to-day and referred to a statement which, he said, had appeared two days ago in the "Evening Standard," to the effect that the paper had been authorised by both Sir E. Grey and the Prime Minister to declare that if the neutrality of either Belgium or Holland was violated, Great Britain would come to the assistance of those countries.

M. van Swinderen thought that this announcement would create a painful impression at The Hague. The Netherlands Government were very touchy on the subject of their independence and their power to look after themselves. They had not so far asked for anybody's assistance, and such an unsolicited offer of assistance would not be welcome.

I told him that I had not seen the paragraph referred to, but I felt quite certain that the alleged authorisation of such a statement by the Prime Minister or Sir E. Grey was an absolute myth. M. van Swinderen was satisfied with this.

E. A. C.

August 2, 1914.

(35552) No. 471.
Communication from German Embassy.

Herr von Schubert called to communicate the annexed telegram(1) from his Government which he was directed to request should be brought to the notice of Sir Edward Grey at once.

I translate:

"This morning 80 French officers in Prussian uniform attempted to cross the German frontier in 12 motor cars at Walbeck, west of Geldern. This constituted the most serious violation of neutrality on the part of France."

(Geldern is near the Dutch-German frontier, some way north of Venloo over 200 kilom. distant from the northernmost point of the Franco-German frontier).

I asked Herr von Schubert in a bantering way whether he meant me to take this statement seriously. The reference to breach of neutrality sounded to me like a joke, in view of the invasion of French territory by the German forces without a declaration of war.

He indignantly declared that the matter was most serious, as the statement emanated from his Government itself.

August 2. E.A.C

For the German text see DD No. 677.

(1) Written in pencil on F.O. paper by Herr v. Schubert.

(35421) No. 472.
Communication from German Embassy. (Received August 2, 1914.)
Kaiserlich Deutsche Botschaft in London.
(Undated.)

Translation.

The Imperial Government was compelled to take military measures in Luxemburg for the protection of the railways situated in that country, which by international agreement are under German control and German administration, against a threatened attack by the French. This step does not imply any hostile action against Luxemburg; full compensation for eventual damage has been promised.

For German text see DD No. 643.

(35411) No. 473.
Communicated by French Ambassador (August 2).
French Minister for Foreign Affairs to M. Cambon.
Télégraphique.
Paris, le 2 août 19l4.

Le territoire français a été violé ce matin par les troupes allemandes à Cirey, près de Longwy. Elles marchent sur le fort qui porte ce nom. D'autre part, le poste douanier à Delle a été assailli par une double fusillade.

Cf. F No. 136.

(35885) No. 474.
Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.
[By Post.]
Paris, August 1, 1914.
Tel. (No. 106.)
R. August 2, 1 P.M.

My telegram No. 104 of yesterday.(1)

Following is M. Viviani's reply dictated to me by the Political Director in regard to the respecting of the neutrality of Belgium:

"Le Gouvernement français est résolu de respecter la neutralité de la Belgique, et ce serait seulement dans le cas où une autre Puissance quelconque violerait cette neutralité que la France pourrait se trouver amenée, pour assurer la défense de sa propre sécurité, d'agir autrement. Cette assurance a été donnée à plusieurs reprises. Le Président en a parlé au Roi des Belges, et le Ministre de France à Bruxelles a renouvelé spontanément cette assurance à M. Davignon."

Cf. F No. 122.

(1) No. 382.

(35375) No. 475.
Mr. Findlay to Sir Edward Grey.
Christiania, August 2, 1914.
D. 12:30 P.M.
Tel. (No. 26.)
R. 1 P.M.

My telegram No. 28.(1)

Norwegian declaration of neutrality is identic with Danish and was issued after consultation between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish Governments.

(1) No. 434.