by Mike Edinger, copyright (C) 2005
The nascent beginnings of modern era naval operations arguably began with the Germans in World War One. They combined air, surface, and sub-surface platforms with signals intelligence to form what we today would call composite naval warfare. As has happened so often, necessity spurred invention. The Germans needed to find some way to isolate and bring portions of the British Grand Fleet to battle. This drove them to use platforms and assets already developed, but not fully integrated into fleet operations, in order to defeat the British in detail. Understanding how the German High Seas Fleet dealt with the complexities of integrating these assets may help the U.S. Navy today learn important lessons as it tries to integrate network centric concepts into its operational doctrine.
Conventional naval wisdom agreed that the two great fleets of Germany and Great Britain would clash at sea within the first few days following the outbreak of war in August 1914. Instead, caution ruled during those first critical weeks of the war. Suddenly, neither Germany nor England seemed eager to wager the outcome of the war on a single battle at sea between their vaunted dreadnoughts. As the oft-quoted Winston Churchill correctly stated, British Grand Fleet Admiral Jellicoe was the only man who could have lost the war in a single afternoon.
The German Naval High Command, under the ever-erratic leadership of "Supreme Warlord" Kaiser Wilhelm II, was under strict orders not to risk the dreadnoughts unless the Kaiser himself had given permission for their commitment to battle. The British fleet commenced its blockade of the German coast, but wisely decided that a traditional close blockade would be too risky and would be subject to constant attacks from German U-boats and the ever present and dangerous mines. They therefore decided to conduct a distant blockade from the approaches to the North Sea.
New Weapons and the German Scouting Shortfall
The Germans started the war with a distinct disadvantage in scouting cruisers. Cruisers were used in conjunction with smaller supporting destroyers in advance of the deployed battlefleet in broadly fanned arcs to locate the enemy fleet and bring it to battle. Combat actions within the first month of the war left the Germans with even fewer cruisers to conduct the scouting that operational doctrine set for the battle fleet. In an attempt to rectify this serious problem, the German Naval High Command turned to a much cheaper (and much faster to build) alternative: one that changed the nature of the war at sea - the Zeppelin airship.
The initial Zeppelins were crude and lacked the endurance and communications equipment necessary to fulfill the role of strategic scouts. Nonetheless, the senior German naval leadership understood the potential to provide the fleet the scouting resources they otherwise lacked. In building the case, Kapitan zur Zee Von Trotha remarked that the use of airships were beneficial to prevent the Fleet from exposure to mines and submarines. (1) As early as March 1915 the Zeppelins were being used for fleet scouting missions. It was also remarkable that the airships were operating tactically with the Fleet, despite the communications difficulties inherent in these platforms. (2) In addition, the airships were frequently subjected to inclement weather (wind, fog, and low cloud cover), and records show their availability for reconnaissance missions was limited to slightly more than 25% (of the days potentially available) during the war. (3)
The Germans made use of seaplanes as well, and there is a perception that they did not pursue their use quite as aggressively as the British Navy. Many of the pioneering efforts of the German use of aviation at sea were experimentally developed in the Baltic Sea, where their efforts at least matched the better known efforts of the Royal Navy. However, the reality was, particularly during the early war years, that naval aircraft lacked the radius, endurance, navigational accuracy, weather worthiness, mechanical reliability, offensive punch (and the ability to project it accurately) that surface ships had. (4) Despite this, Vizeadmiral Hipper, who was the biggest German proponent of seaplanes, helped the German Navy actively pursue the development of seaplane tenders, the torpedo plane, and aerial mine laying. The Germans ultimately used these tactics far more extensively than the Royal Navy, particularly in the Baltic Sea against the Russian Navy. (5)
The High Seas Fleet early on recognized the ability of the submarine to provide valuable intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. Vizeadmiral Rheinhard Scheer in particular, after he assumed command of the Fleet on 24 January 1916, advocated the aggressive use of submarines and the integration of the U-boats into operational planning for the fleet. His ideas included using the U-boats to scout for the fleet and to relay any information regarding enemy positions and movements. However, once again the technical problems associated with the infant wireless communications technology then available hampered effective coordination and use of their reports. Scheer planned to use U-boats in ambushes to attrit the British Grand Fleet units as they sailed to the main fleet engagement. Ideally, if this operational objective would have been achieved, then actual fleet combat may have approached the parity levels needed in order for the German Fleet to have at least an even chance to prevail in battle with the British.
Naval Intelligence and the use of deception in preparing for Fleet action
The German use of intelligence and Signals interception was a key part of their operational planning. Their intelligence collecting efforts are again not as well known or documented, nor were they as successful as the British "Room 40" and Royal Naval Intelligence under Capt. "Blinker" Hall. The German equivalent of Room 40 was their Entzifferzungsdienst (E-Dienst or deciphering service) Naval Communications listening station at Neumunster. (6) The Germans worked hard to analyze British naval communications patterns and were occasionally (but not always) able to warn the their fleet when the British were at sea or when a major naval event was to occur. Using information from an intercepted British weather report, Neumunster successfully warned the fleet prior to the Jutland operation that the main British fleet elements had sailed from port. (7)
The Germans were aware that the British were listening to their own communications, but were amazed at just how much information the British had about their pending operations. The German Navy had no idea of course that the British had access to all of their code books, and were able to read their mail! The Germans believed that they were being compromised by spies (they were, but not to the extent believed by the Germans) and by their own communications patterns. Ironically, by mirror imaging their own perceived weaknesses onto the British, the German Navy actually improved their knowledge of British communication patterns. As noted above for example, the Germans knew major British fleet operations were pending when weather reports were sent to their fleet units. Knowledge of British communications listening and intelligence capabilities led them to use deception plans to improve on their overall operational effectiveness. On 31 May 1916, Neumunster sent out false communications to make the British believe the German High Seas Fleet was still in the Jade Estuary roadstead when in fact they had already sailed. The deception worked and the British did not recognize they were fooled for several critical hours until they realized the German Navy was using a new operational code. (8)
The German Operational Problem
From the war's beginnings, the German Navy constantly sought ways to isolate and surprise certain elements of the Grand Fleet and to defeat them in turn. Only by achieving local superiority and victory over isolated units of the British Fleet did the High Seas Fleet stand any chance of ultimately defeating the numerically superior British Navy. In order to isolate British naval task forces, the German Navy recognized the need to use all the "tools" it had within its force structure.
As previously noted, the High Seas Fleet employed the airship, submarine, and new technically advanced methods of deceptive intelligence to accomplish this objective. As early as the spring of 1915, then Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Hugo von Pohl recognized the need for different elements of the High Seas Fleet to work together. In hindsight, it is clear that Pohl (and most of the German Naval High Command) did not understand the Zeppelin's possibilities for long-range strategic Fleet reconnaissance. Pohl used the airships for limited tactical reconnaissance around the fleet somewhat like a defensive girdle, and almost within sight of each other and supported Fleet units. If he had used them more aggressively, they may have been able to locate the Grand Fleet units on more than a few occasions in the Spring of 1915, when both sides were attempting to bring each other to battle. However, it must be stated that the Kaiser's reluctance to risk the German dreadnoughts (particularly after the Battle of Dogger Bank in January 1915) was more responsible for the cautious approach rather than the timidness of Pohl. Ironically, it was this cautious nature and aversion to risk that spurred him to expand the airship arm beyond what was initially envisioned. (9)
Admiral Pohl articulated his new policies regarding the Zeppelins in a 4 June 1915 letter, which elevated the Airship Division to a permanent arm of the Fleet. Furthermore, this six-point letter outlined new uses for the Zeppelins: for work against mine fields, hunting enemy submarines, and as replacements for light and fast scouting cruisers. It also raised the potential for cooperation between airships and submarines, and called for more airship sheds and radio direction-finding equipment. The letter additionally outlined the need for 18 operational Naval airships, in order to have 12 available for Fleet use at any given time. (10)
Throughout the rest of 1915, with overall strategic emphasis being placed on the submarine and commerce warfare, the High Seas Fleet failed to coordinate effectively the Airship Division and surface units even when they were at sea. In fact, the airships frequently went to sea without any surface ship accompaniment, even though better coordination could have ensured mutually supported reconnaissance operations. (11) When Scheer took over command of the High Seas Fleet in January 1916, he quickly appealed to the Kaiser, advocating a new strategy, which would hopefully bring the British to battle and break the punishing British blockade. Scheer pushed for, and received, permission from the Kaiser, to use the High Seas Fleet in a heretofore much more aggressive manner.
Among the first things Scheer directed was better coordination between the airship division and surface reconnaissance efforts. More than ever before, Scheer depended on airships to provide cover and reconnaissance for the fleet. Integration of what became composite naval force planning was taken seriously. The airships were no longer an afterthought; they were progressively worked into operations for the long anticipated main battlefleet engagement. The airships were increasingly used to scout British naval bases and to report on port activity. On 24 April 1916, as part of his more aggressive strategy, Scheer ordered a raid on the English town of Lowestoft, which again was designed to trap a portion of the Grand Fleet before other elements could come to its rescue. A Zeppelin (L-9) assigned to the operation warned Konteradmiral Boedicker (temporary commander of German Battlecruiser forces) of the approaching Harwich Force units as he was preparing to bombard Lowestoft. After completing bombardment of the town, Boedicker pursued the Harwich Force but failed in this excellent opportunity to destroy it. Instead, he broke off action and turned west due to English submarine sighting reports. (12)
The Jutland Operation
In late April 1916, just after the Lowestoft operation, American pressure influenced the German Naval High Command to change its operational U-boat tactics. New orders directed U-boats to carry out commerce warfare in accordance with prize law regulations. This resulted in Scheer having more submarines available for operations against enemy warships than ever before. Submarines were directly attached to the High Seas Fleet for the first time, and a submarine Commodore was assigned to Scheer's staff in order to coordinate the submarines into fleet operational planning while at sea. (13) In May 1916, Scheer chose to raid the English port of Sunderland, midway up the UK East Coast, in order to entice the British out. His operational concept for what eventually became the battle of Jutland called for 15 submarines to be held back from anti-commerce patrols and instead they were assigned to stations within fanned arcs outside all major British naval bases. The submarines on station were to be backed up by airships reconnoitering over the western North Sea and British Naval bases in order to report Grand Fleet locations. Scheer's plan for deployment of this many submarines from early to mid May 1916 was designed to lure the British into these submarine traps so that they could sink or cripple as many dreadnoughts as possible as they came out of their bases. (14)
Scheer knew, as discussed above, the British capability to anticipate the German fleet's movements whenever it sortied. For this operation, using that knowledge to his advantage, Scheer hung out his dreadnoughts as bait to lure the British to battle on what he hoped would be favorable terms. He anticipated the U-boats would sink or cripple enough of the British heavy units to even Britain's numerical superiority. However, unfinished repairs to the critical Battlecruiser SEYDLITZ prevented the operation, already once delayed, from commencing as planned on 23 May.
Once the repairs to the SEYDLITZ were finally completed on the 28th, bad weather prevented the Zeppelins from taking off and scouting the western North Sea. Determined to have adequate airship reconnaissance so that he would not be brought into action against his will, he again delayed the High Seas Fleet sortie. Unfortunately for the Germans, the U-boats had already sailed and were on station waiting for the Grand Fleet. Since the early U-boats lacked the long endurance and adequate communications abilities, they already had pre-existing orders to return to base on 1 June. If Scheer was to use the U-boat trap he had devised, he needed to sail before 1 June. He therefore was forced to change his plan and decided to sail north along the coast of Jutland, vice to Sunderland, where he calculated airship reconnaissance would not be as critical to operational success. (15)
Only two of ten U-boats (U-32 and U-66) on station off the two principal British bases received the operational signal informing them of the sailing of the High Seas Fleet; therefore, just these two boats were in position to attack the Grand Fleet as it put to sea. Not only were the U-boats unable to find an adequate number of targets to attack, and failed to score any hits when they did, but they were also unable to communicate effectively to Neumunster the importance of the numbers of ships they saw. Furthermore, Neumunster was unable to fuse together the pieces of intelligence it did glean for Scheer, nor alert him to the gravity of the situation. (16)
Due to the weather, the airship's inability to cover the western North Sea basically determined the time and place of the pending battle. Scheer made a clean break from Pohl's operational doctrine and ordered strategic scouting missions for the Zeppelins. These were considerably in advance of, and distant from, the main Battle Fleet and cruiser destroyer screens. The revised scouting plan ordered five Zeppelins to take off between 0300 and 0900 on 31 May to cover assigned sector screen patrol areas in advance of the High Seas Fleet's move up the Jutland coast. The most distant area was 325 miles from their airship base in Nordholtz. The weather was still basically unsuitable for airship operations, and those that did take off were ineffective because of low cloud cover over the area of operations. (17)
During the battle of Jutland itself, at least two airships were above or near the action and certainly heard the engagement; however, they could not participate directly because of low cloud cover. Later in the evening of 31 May, as Scheer found himself in extremis, not once, but twice, he "urgently requested" needed airship reconnaissance to be completed by the morning hours for the Horn Reef area. Clearing weather did enable two Zeppelins to observe the night action between the British and German Fleets, and one Zeppelin actually did make a successful and useful report to Scheer. (18)
Even though the battle was portrayed as great victory in Germany, Scheer knew better. He was very lucky to have escaped a severe mauling, and even possible total destruction of his fleet. More importantly, the Germans did not change the fundamental strategic situation; they were still suffocating under the ever-effective British blockade. While his damaged warships were undergoing quick repairs for another try at the British, he worked on his after-battle report, which proved quite insightful regarding his thinking on the integration of his airships and submarines into fleet operations. Scheer stated that effective strategic scouting provided the utmost security against surprise by superior enemy forces. Therefore, classic scouting was fundamental for more extended operations. However, he was also the first to recognize that strategic airship scouting did not play a decisive role in the Jutland operation. Their last minute attempt to gather information before daylight on 1 June was of only marginal overall usefulness. (19) Submarines too, despite the attempts to integrate their support for the fleet proved ineffective for this operation.
The Sunderland Operation
Vizeadmiral Scheer was determined, however, to mount another operation just as soon as he could get his fleet into some sort of fighting order. He quickly reintroduced the plan he was previously forced to abandon in May due to submarine unavailability and poor weather. He had a total of 21 dreadnoughts ready for action along with an unprecedented screen of 24 U-boats that could cover his flanks and attack any British warships. This time, he was determined to have the appropriate extensive airship reconnaissance cover, as well as the large submarine force in place to provide additional screening, reconnaissance and ambush traps. The Sunderland Operation of 16-19 Aug 1916 deployed nine submarines off Flambourgh Head, and Blyth off Northnumberland. These U-boats were in a position to attack as many high value British units coming out of port as possible before the commencement of the operation. (20)
He also moved ten Zeppelins to pre-assigned sectors to screen in front of the battle fleet. Eight managed to take off in the early morning hours of 19 August. Room 40 was again able to warn the Grand Fleet, enabling them to sally early in advance of the Germans. At one point the German and British Fleets were only about 40 miles apart, steaming directly toward each other, and it seemed likely a major engagement would take place. However, one of the Zeppelins (L-13) warned Scheer of an approaching British Naval force from the South that included some battleships. Scheer thought that this was his great opportunity to destroy an isolated element of the British Fleet and ordered his fleet South, turning directly away from Jellicoe and the main British Force. In fact, the reconnaissance report was in error; this group turned out to be the Harwich Force of British Light Cruisers and destroyers - not battleships. (21) Hipper, with the lead German Scouting Group, then ordered Zeppelin L-11 to scout further to the North for the British Fleet.
As Scheer turned away, U-52, scored three direct hits on the British light cruiser, NOTTINGHAM of the Grand Fleet. Jellicoe mistakenly believed he was running into a German minefield and turned North to avoid it, taking him still further away from Scheer. Another German U-boat (U-53) reported the Grand Fleet's position to Scheer soon after the British fleet turned north. As the day progressed, airships L-31 and L-11 detailed the positions of the British battlefleet, and L-13 reported on the British Harwich Force. Scheer at first was somewhat confused, and refused to believe the entire British fleet had been just 65 miles away, but as further confirming intelligence reports came in, he cancelled the Sunderland operation and ordered the High Seas Fleet home. (22) U-66 also sank the British light cruiser, FALMOUTH, further deterring Jellicoe from aggressive pursuit that evening. (23)
This was the first, and last time that strategic airship reconnaissance played a significant role in German naval composite force operations during the war. Even though it was an error in reporting which caused the Germans to turn South to pursue the Harwich Force, The reconnaissance Scheer deployed to prevent from being surprised ultimately provided him with crucial intelligence on the Royal Navy's dispositions, thus saving the High Seas Fleet. (24) Scheer never again ventured so far into the North Sea. After Sunderland, the German Naval High Command felt that the potential gain of trying to isolate and destroy smaller British units was not worth the risk. The increasingly greater numbers of available U-boats gave the Germans hope that this was the weapon that would break the blockade and turn the tables on the English, forcing them to sue for peace.
To the End of the War
The Germans successfully used composite naval force operations in their assault on the Russian held islands off Riga in the Baltic Sea. Airships provided naval gunfire support and covering reconnaissance. After they initiated unrestricted submarine warfare, they used some Zeppelins to report on merchant traffic patterns for the remainder of the war. The Germans also used airship missions to identify British mine fields for minesweepers to clear outside the main German roadsteads. There were plans to use major composite naval force operations (along similar lines laid out in the Jutland and Sunderland operations) in October, 1918, but that operation never occurred due to mutinies in the German Fleet. (25)
The Germans had numerous problems integrating intelligence with airship, submarine and surface units to provide the High Seas Fleet command staff the proper strategic and operational warning it sought for combat operations. The Germans failed to exploit the true capabilities of the airship as a long-range scouting platform. Along with the problems of integrating the submarines into composite battle force planning, additional issues such as a lack of better signals intelligence, communications capabilities, training, doctrine, experience, and force structure suited to the task contributed to the German lack of success. It was not a paucity of ideas or attempt, but the early technology of Zeppelins and U-boats was, simply put, unreliable. It was further impaired by a lack of planning and appropriate doctrine, where wishful thinking substituted for a thorough analysis and understanding of the results. (26)
The attempted German integration of air, surface, and sub-surface platforms into what today we call composite naval force operations resulted from the need for better intelligence and reconnaissance of the British Fleet, and the need to get that information to the fleet commander quickly. The need for better and faster operational intelligence 85 years ago is just as relevant today, as the Navy's network centric warfare pursues goals of operating at ever increasing speeds to stay within the enemy's decision making cycles.
Footnotes
1. Robinson, Douglass H. "The Zeppelin in Combat: The German Naval Airship Division 1912-1918" p.103
2. Groos, Otto, and Gladisch, Walter, " Der Krieg in der Nordsee", Berlin 1920-7, six vols., vol iv, page 71-72
3. Robinson, p. 373
4. Layman, R.D., "Naval Aviation in the First World War", Annapolis, 1996, p.31
5. Ibid, p.39
6. Tarrant, V. E., "Jutland, The German Perspective", Annapolis, 1995, p.33-34
7. Beasly, Patrick, "Room 40, British Naval Intelligence, 1914-1918" p.153
8. Beasly, p.155, and Tarrant, p.33-34 and 58-60
9. Robinson, p. 103-05
10. Ibid, p. 112-13
11. Groos, Vol. IV, p.206
12. Tarrant, p.46-49
13. Robinson, p. 141-157, and Tarrant , p. 45-51
14. Robinson, p.163-5, and Tarrant, p. 49-54
15. Robinson, p.163-5
16. Groos, Vol. V, p.213-214
17. Ibid, p.165
18. Ibid, p. 165-67. Had the British taken advantage of this radio intercept, which Room 40, for some inexplicable reason did not pass to Admiral Jellicoe, they very well may have cut off the German fleet from its bases, and destroyed it.
19. Ibid, p. 169
20. Yates, Keith, "Flawed Victory", Annapolis, 2000, p. 246-247
21. Robinson, p.182
22. Yates, p.247, and Robinson, p. 182
23. After the Sunderland operation, the Admiral Jellicoe also issued orders for the fleet to be circumspect in venturing out into the southern North Sea until they could be sure the possibility of catching the German Fleet was worth the danger to the fleet from mines and U-boats.
24. Gray, Edwin "A Killing Time", New York, 1972, p.159, and Robinson, p.183, and Yates, p.247
25. Robinson, p.276 and 360-74
26. Robinson, p.375
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