Books, like ships, are obsolete the moment they are launched. In the case of my book, I knew it was doomed to obsolescence from the start, given the tremendous pace of the publishing of naval books in Russia. Moreover, the last months of work on the manuscript were something of a blur, as I tried to write new sections, edit old ones, insert the latest material wherever possible, locate the last photographs and crank out the last drawings required. In all that rush, I made some mistakes -- I simply didn't have enough time to think some things through or look closely at some puzzles and contradictions. Finally, the usual small factual and typographical errors crept in during the process of writing and editing. Since the book appeared I have been keeping a log of all the mistakes that I have seen or had called to my attention, and hoped to find some way of making them available to everyone who bought the book. Thanks to Bill Schleihauf, I now have that opportunity.

I have divided the list into three sections, one for major errors and factual mistakes -- the big stuff. The second section covers supplementary information on minor points -- dates, dimensions, etc. -- that I have received since publication. The third section lists the typos, which are generally pretty minor.

I should add one final note not about what's in the book, but about what is not in the book. Judging by comments I have received from friends, the biggest omission in the book is the failure to cover the Soviet "heavy" cruiser designs of the Kronshtadt (Project 69) and Stalingrad (Project 82) classes. The decision to leave these out was a difficult one, based on the need to reduce the size of the book to publishable dimensions. However, I have since published an article on the Kronshtadt class ("Project 69: The Kronshtadt Class Battlecruisers," Warship 2004 [London: Conway Maritime Press, 2004], pages 99-117). And barring unforeseen circumstances, my article on the Stalingrad class will appear in Warship 2006. These articles, while based on the chapters originally written for the battleship book, are much expanded and feature wonderful drawings by John Roberts.

I'm sure more errors in the book will be discovered; please let me know if you find any mistakes not listed below, or if you run across information that might supplement the material in the book. You can contact me at smclaughlin@sfpl.org.

Thanks!
Section I: Factual Mistakes

Note: When counting lines, the heading (e.g., "Design and Construction," "General Features," etc.) is counted as one line, while the blank lines above and below it are not counted.

Page 63: Col. 1, line 22: In discussing the armament of Georgii Pobedonosets, it is stated that Ekaterina II and Chesma had 12-in/30 guns, but in fact Chesma had 12-in/35 guns. (My thanks to Ian Sturton for catching this one).

Page 72: The table of ship's characteristics for the Tri Sviatitelia gives her "actual" displacement as 13,318 tons, but on page 289 this figure is given for her displacement after her reconstruction in 1911-1912. (Thanks again are due to Ian Sturton for noting this.) The ship's actual displacement upon entry into service is therefore unclear. According to Istoriia otechestvennogo sudostroeniia, vol. II, page 285, the ship had a design displacement of 12,480 tons, but was 900 tons overweight when she entered service, which indicates a displacement of about 13,380 tons. The navy's "ship list" of 1904 gives the 13,318-ton displacement, and it seems unlikely that the ship still had precisely the same displacement after her major reconstruction in 1911-1912. Istoriia otechestvennogo sudostroeniia, vol. II, page 515, note 15 states that "In 1907 the ship's overweight amounted to 1,550 tons, and her excess draft was 0.79m, due to which her armor belt was almost entirely covered with water" (i.e., was almost entirely submerged). It therefore seems likely that 13,318 tons was an official "ship list" displacement, that the ship began life about 900 tons overweight, which by 1907 had reached 1,550 tons, and that after her reconstruction in 1911-1912 the overweight was considerably decreased, but the actual figure for her displacement after the reconstruction does not seem to be given in any available sources.

Page 87: Col. 1, line 10: The designed metacentric height of the Poltava class quoted is incorrect; the figure given is actually the height of the metacenter above the design waterline, not above her center of gravity. I have not been able to find the metacentric height for these ships.

Page 132: Table, bottom of col. 1: The weight breakdown for Tsesarevich as designed is given as 13,105 tons, but according to the characteristics given on page 129, her designed displacement was 12,915 tons. The difference seems to be due to the 200-ton design margin. It seems likely that the weight breakdown is from a later design stage, and the question of what her displacement was upon entry into service remains open.

Page 145: The photograph shows the Imperator Aleksandr III, not the Slava. (My thanks to Bil Ragan for this correction.)

Pages 240-241: For some reason the profile drawing of dreadnought Imperator Aleksandr III includes an extra 130mm gun; it shows eleven guns, giving a total of 22 guns, port and starboard, whereas the design included only 20 guns. The extra gun is the
one abreast the after edge of the second funnel. In addition, the foremost gun was removed before the ship entered service, and the casemate blanked off.

Page 241: Col. 2, line 15: *Imperator Aleksandr III/Volia* is said to have been renamed *General Alekseev* in October 1920, but it should be October 1919.

Page 289: Col. 2, line 5: *Tri Sviatitelia's* post-reconstruction displacement is given as 13,318 tons. See above under page 72 for a discussion.

Page 394: Col. 1, line 8 and following: This is undoubtedly the worst mistake in the book. In describing the internal arrangements of the *Sovetskii Soiuz* (Project 23) class, I wrote: "The machinery arrangement was unusual, with two forward boiler rooms, each with two boilers, then a machinery compartment with turbines for all three shafts (presumably separated by longitudinal bulkheads), then a single boiler room with two more boilers." This is completely wrong. In my own defense I was misled by the absence in the available longitudinal section of any engine rooms aside from the one mentioned above, so I assumed all three turbines were located there. As it turns out, the engine rooms for the wing-shaft turbines flanked a narrow centerline compartment, and so they did not show up on the section, which showed the ship along the centerline. A corrected and more detailed description might read as follows:

The machinery arrangement was unusual; working from fore to aft, the turbine compartments for the wing shafts were located immediately abaft the magazines for turret No. 2, separated by a narrow centerline compartment for various ship control stations as well as the main fire control post; then came No. 1 boiler room, then a short compartment, then No. 2 boiler room, followed by another short compartment, then the engine room for the center shaft's turbine flanked by turbo-generator compartments, and finally boiler room No. 3. Each boiler room contained two boilers. This unusual arrangement, somewhat reminiscent of Italian practice, provided good dispersal of the machinery spaces, but at the cost of very long runs for the wing shafts (ca. 105m); it also meant that the boilers in Nos. 1 and 2 boiler rooms had to be raised sufficiently for the wing propeller shafts to pass beneath them.

The fact that the forward engine rooms were so far forward explains why one of the changes sought in the Project 23NU design was a reduction in the propeller shaft lengths, which were considered excessive in the Project 23 design (see page 399).

Page 396: Col. 1, lines 28-31: For some reason I made some rather elaborate calculations to determine the dimensions for Project 23bis, while the actual dimensions are given in *Gangut*, no. 16, page 64. I don't know how I missed them. The dimensions are:

278m wl, 285.9m oa x 37.1m wl, 39.9m oa x 10.27m
912ft 1in wl, 938ft oa x 121ft 9in wl, 130ft 11in oa x 33ft 8in
Page 399: The drawing on page 427, labeled as being "The first variant of Project 24," actually seems to be one of the versions of the Project 23NU design (see note to page 427).

Page 427: The drawing, described as "The first variant of Project 24," actually seems to be Project 23NU; so this drawing should be replaced by one based on the design shown in Gangut no. 12, page 7, which is the actual Project 24 first variant. These drawings make it clear that Project 23NU and Project 24 were extraordinarily similar, probably due to the fact that TsKB-4 used Project 23NU as the starting point for Project 24.

Page 475: Col. 1, line 9: Endnote 2 of Chapter 45 can be deleted, since it explains the derivation of my approximate numbers for the dimensions of Project 23bis, whereas the actual design figures are available; see note to page 396, above. Endnotes 3, 4, 5, and 6 would then need to be renumbered.

Section II: Supplementary Data

Note: When counting lines, the heading (e.g., "Design and Construction," "General Features," etc.) is counted as one line, while the blank lines above and below it are not counted.

Pages 43-44: Imperator Nikolai I's "Early Modifications": Ian Sturton notes that the photo on page 43 shows the ship with much shorter funnels than the photo on page 44, so presumably their height was increased relatively early in the ship's career.

Page 45: Col. 2, line 4: Iki, ex-Imperator Nikolai I, was sunk 3 October 1915. My thanks to Lars Ahlberg for this information (e-mail dated 30 June 2004).

Page 67: Col. 2, line 31: Ian Sturton mentions that Navarin may have been nicknamed "Lots Road Power Station" by British sailors because of her four funnels.

Page 107: Ship characteristics table for the Peresvet class: Osliabia may have entered service in August 1901 (Berezhnoi, page 38), Pobeda in October 1902 (ditto). Note, however, that Mel'nikov, page 31, says that Pobeda was officially accepted on 25 February/10 March 1903. Guber, page 120, says Peresvet entered service in August 1901. So the dates for these ships are a bit of a mess.

Page 115: Col. 2, line 29: Suvo, ex-Pobeda, reclassified as a "miscellaneous" vessel on 1 April 1922; scrapping begun 11 May 1922, ship capsized (as stated) 13 July 1922. Dismantling of hull completed 25 September 1922, submerged hulk remained at Mitsugojima, eventually scrapped. (All per Lars Ahlberg, e-mail dated 12 July 2004). The fact that the submerged hulk remained in place probably explains why Jentschura et al. indicated that the ship wasn't scrapped until after World War II. In addition to adding the
dates provided by Lars, the following should be deleted: "(According to other reports, she survived as a hulk at Mitsugo until 1945-46)" (col. 2, lines 30-31). Endnote 9 (the text of which appears on page 459) should be replaced by a citation to Lars' e-mail.


Page 146: Col. 1, lines 24-25, col. 2 lines 1-2: *Iwami*, ex-*Orël*, reclassified as "miscellaneous" vessel 9 May 1923; used for aviation bombing trials, 8-10 July 1924, sinking off the Miura Peninsula on 10 July.

Page 202: Col. 1, line 7: In discussing the early Russian dreadnought designs, I mention that K.K. Ratnik, the retired head of the Baltic Works, was made chairman of the special commission to examine the designs submitted. In fact, Ratnik was not merely the retired head of the Baltic Works, but at the time held the post of chief inspector of shipbuilding. Oddly, the major sources for the design of the first Russian dreadnoughts do not mention Ratnik's position, leaving one with the impression that he was sort of picked out of a hat to supervise this important work.

Page 230: Col. 1, line 2: In discussing the origins of the *Imperatritsa Mariia* class, I state that the Russians heard rumors that the Turks had ordered two battleships, but Brook, page 143, establishes that Turkey ordered only one battleship from Vickers in 1911, to be built to Armstrong's design no. 698C. The rumor that the Turks were going to have two battleships built nevertheless played a part in the inception of the Black Sea dreadnought design.

Page 256: Col. 1, line 3: Turkey is quoted as ordering two battleships, but only one was ordered; see note to page 230, above.

Page 379: In the table of characteristics for the *Sovetskii Soiuz* (Project 23) class, I provide figures for the ammunition outfit of the various calibers of guns the ship was to carry. Platonov, page 69, gives somewhat different figures, as shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Platonov</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 x 406mm:</td>
<td>100rpg</td>
<td>100rpg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 x 152mm</td>
<td>170rpg</td>
<td>150rpg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 x 100mm</td>
<td>400rpg</td>
<td>300rpg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32 x 37mm</td>
<td>1,800rpg</td>
<td>800rpg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is possible that the ammunition allowances per barrel had to be reduced when the number of 100mm guns was increased, i.e., the relative sizes of the magazines for different calibers may have been adjusted. It should be borne in mind that the Project 23 design underwent such a long development period, with many changes being made even
after construction was started, that it is likely that different researchers have come across
documents from different stages of the process.

Page 383: Col. 2, line 6: In discussing the early stages of the Project 23 design, I
mention, but do not illustrate, the 47,700-ton technical design completed in April 1937.
To date, no drawing of this class has appeared in a Russian publication; nevertheless,
there is a possibility that such a drawing is available. Siegfried Breyer has published
drawings based on "a builder's (model) plan originating in the Soviet Union," which seem
to reflect the characteristics of the design at this point in its long evolution (Breyer 1980,
page 379; the same drawing appears in Breyer 2002, page 372. A painting of this design
by A.N. Lubianov also appeared in Sudostroenie, no. 10, 1985, page 52.). Although this
possibility cannot be confirmed, Breyer's drawing showed many of the features of the
final Project 23 design at a time when reliable illustrations of this design had not yet
appeared in the Soviet Union or the west (the main points of similarity are the aircraft
hangar arrangements, support under the director at the after end of the superstructure, the
shape of the 37mm turrets, and the shapes of the funnels). These details indicate that the
Breyer drawing is based on some authentic drawings, rather than some Russian modeller's
flight of fancy. If this evaluation is correct, and the Breyer drawings does indeed represent
an actual stage in the Project 23 design's development, it most closely matches the
47,700-ton design of April 1937. But at the moment this is all speculation.

Page 394: Col. 2, line 2: Platonov, page 69, gives the following electrical plant: Four
turbo-generators, each of 1,200kW, and four diesel generators, each of 650kW, working
at 115V.

Page 459: Col. 2, lines 27 and following: The existing text should be replaced with a
citation to Lars' e-mail, dated 12 July 2004, reflecting the corrections to Suwo's demise on
page 115.

Section III: Typographical Errors

Note: When counting lines, the heading (e.g., "Design and Construction," "General
Features," etc.) is counted as one line, while the blank lines above and below it are not
counted.

Page xi: Col. 2, 6 lines from bottom. The initial letters of Naval General Staff
should be capitalized.

Page xiv: Col. 2, line 16: "civilian design" should read "Guliaev design." I have no
idea how this strange substitution happened.

Page 1:Column 1, under "Armament": "spar torpedoes" should appear on a separate line
from "(4-pdr)". As for the caliber of these guns, 4-pdr seems very light for an 87mm gun,
but these figures are correct, based on Russian publications. It may be that the "pounder"
designation was actually based on that of old smoothbore guns firing round shot; the sailing Russian navy had a 3-pdr of 76mm bore and a 6-pdr of 96mm bore, so the 87mm would fit right between these. In other words, the shell actually fired by this rifled gun might have been much heavier than its nominal designation indicated.

Page 116: Table, column 1: "Contracted" should read "Ordered." According to Mel'nikov, page 31, the ship was ordered on 26 July/8 August 1896.

Page 145: Col. 1, line 6: It should be Marshal (one L), not Marshall (two Ls), Kutuzov.

Page 341: Table 39.1, header of right-hand column; "Parizhskaia revoliutsiia" should of course read "Parizhskaia kommuna."

Page 389: Col. 2, line 37: "hangers" should be "hangars."

Page 399: Col. 2, last line: Reference should be to Chapter 48, not 47.

Ian Sturton noted that the dates given for the destruction of the engines of the Black Sea Fleet's predreadnoughts by the retreating British forces varied from ship to ship; more research is probably needed determine the exact dates. Here is what's in the text at the moment:

Page 31. Col. 2, line 8: Engines of Sinop were destroyed on 25 April 1919.

Page 64. Col. 2, line 16: Engines of Georgii Pobedonosets destroyed on 25 April 1919.

Page 76. Col. 2, line 17: Engines of Tri Sviatitelia destroyed on 24 April 1919.


Page 121. Col. 1, line 16: Engines of Panteleimon destroyed 19 April 1919.


Works Cited:


Mel'nikov, R.M. *Bronenostsy tipa "Borodino."* St. Petersburg: Korabli i srazheniia, 1996.