Edward N. Hurley



IT WAS My observation before the Peace Conference met, and while the negotiations were going on among Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando and other European men of power, that it was not the League of Nations, the World Court or the "Freedom of the Seas" in which the European powers were interested primarily; but rather, the recovery and enhancement of pre-war economic advantage. International commerce and ships always came to the fore. France wanted her own ships in which to carry her imports. Great Britain feared the competition of our fleet. The Italians were trying to protect themselves, not only by the attempted acquisition of ships, but by passing laws that established government monopolies in important commodities. The British and French also expressed possibility of nationalizing the traffic in oil and other basic commodities, in order to control markets and prevent threatened American domination of the seas. Even the Greeks turned up with demands.

Posters that greeted the eye at every turn in Paris---"Que l'Allemagne paye d'abord" they read---distilled the very essence of French political and economic sentiment. It was this admonition to "let Germany pay first" that tied the hands of French statesmen at Treves, at Spa, at Brussels and at the Peace Conference. Whenever we encountered the granite resistence of the French, whenever it appeared that reparations might be imperiled, we knew the French Government heads were but expressing the opinion of every hamlet and city in France. British colonies were just as desirous of exacting the last penny of punitive damages. Premier Hughes, of the Australian Commonwealth, vehemently declared that an Australian who had mortgaged his home to buy war bonds was entitled to reparation as much as any French peasant whose house had been destroyed by the enemy. Lloyd George had been reelected on a platform which pledged him to collect from Germany "shilling for shilling, and ton for ton of ships."

No country can live interminably at the expense of another. The French had gained the upper hand of Germany. Now they were for "milking" the Germans dry. Any one familiar with the elements of economics knows that such "milking" cannot be continued long. French statesmen knew it. But such was the poverty of the French people, and such the pressure of public opinion, that they piled exactions on exactions. The time seemed ripe for optimistic counsel. When Jean Monnet, French member of the Allied Maritime Transport Executive, visited me in Paris in January, 1919, I seized the opportunity to give him my views on the rehabilitation of France. He was impressed with my argument that France ought to concern herself with trade, particularly with export trade, rather than with war; and was enthusiastic over my suggestion that France then had an opportunity to "sell" herself to the world---an opportunity that would not soon occur again. He asked me to express my views in a public address. On January 26, 1919, 1 delivered a speech at the Cercle Volney, in which I repeated the advice I gave to Monnet. I urged the French to set earnestly to work; pointed out the tempting foreign market that was waiting to buy French goods; suggested that French products should be boldly and proudly marked "Made in France," and advocated government recognition of export efforts by emblazoning the names of successful exporters on a roll of honor. At the same time I advanced the idea that all nations should be able to buy raw materials on an equal-price basis. For twenty-five years Germany had devoted her energies not only to building up a formidable military organization, but also to developing her commercial enterprises. German military strength having been destroyed, France should expect stronger commercial competition from Germany when fully restored. I urged that France organize her business forces, just as Germany had organized her army, and make the same wholehearted response to industrial opportunity that greeted the French call to arms.

The address made a more favorable impression than I had dared to hope. It was so widely published that I received many letters from French business men, asking for more detailed information on the method of procedure. A similar effect was produced by an interview I gave M. Bunau-Varilla, editor of Le Matin. I wanted to help France in a practical way, and suggested that our ships be used for transportation of French products rather than to have them return in ballast.


Clementel and Tardieu were particularly insistent and persuasive in their efforts to increase the French merchant fleet, by trying to induce the British and Americans to sell tonnage and to arrange well in advance of the signing of the treaty of peace just what ships France would receive from Germany by way of reparations. Great Britain actually had promised to sell 500,000 tons to France. The French thought that it would be highly appropriate for the United States to sell them 800,000 tons. At the bottom of the French plea was the fear that France would not be able to import raw materials at a price equivalent to that paid by her competitors. French ships totalled 2,000,000 gross tons before the war. It now was proposed to triple this tonnage, because it was feared that if the United States and Great Britain were to dominate international shipping they would control raw material markets through freight rates. Here was the very type of international problem it was supposed the League of Nations would solve. The constitution of the League had not then been drafted. I knew how near the League lay to the heart of the President. He alone could decide this shipping squabble. Therefore, I turned a polite but deaf ear to suggestions of the British, Italians and French officials, in this respect. I decided we had to wait for the President's arrival in France. In that decision all finally concurred.

Despite the enormous tonnage we had built, such was still the demand for ships that shipowners everywhere were clamoring for bottoms. The United States had by far the largest ship-building capacity, and foreigners appealed to us for permission to place orders in American yards. I discussed these appeals with the President, in Paris. He refused to consider them while peace negotiations still were pending, and even authorized me to inform the United States Senate that no concessions should be made which would open our shipyards to the construction of vessels for foreign accounts.

Since shipping was to play so important a role at the Peace Conference, at the request of President Wilson I established a Shipping Board office in Paris. It was in full operation by the time he arrived. Part of the organization was drawn from the Allied Maritime Transport Council, which had functioned in London during the war. Data were secured from Washington and from the London office of the American Section of the Allied Maritime. Transport Council. The President found our Paris office exceedingly useful. During the Peace Conference he drew upon it heavily for information regarding ships and shipping. After my return to Washington, my associate Henry M. Robinson, who had kept, in constant touch with the President, was able to use, at the Brussels conference, data which the Paris office furnished on the exchange of German ships for food.


When I returned to Paris from Treves, the preliminaries of the Peace Conference were being discussed. It was my good fortune to attend the opening session at the Quai d'Orsay on January 18, 1919, when President Wilson placed M. Clemenceau. in nomination for the chairmanship. He was followed by Lloyd George, in a seconding speech. It was a wonderful opportunity to contrast the methods of the two men who thus put Clemenceau at the head of the Conference. Both were impressive; but the President had a sense of style that Lloyd George lacked, a gift of impressing his thoughts upon a rapt audience in sentences sharply-chiseled and cadenced.

In his seconding speech, Lloyd George referred to Clemenceau as "the grand young man." He spoke in English, and when he had concluded the interpreter repeated his speech in French. When the translator came to that portion of the remarks of Lloyd George wherein he had referred to Clemenceau, as "the grand young man," the interpreter, by mistake used the French equivalent of "the grand old man." Lloyd George did not speak French, but he understood enough of the language to know that the interpreter had made an error. He protested, saying "No! No! I said, 'the grand young man' ! " The audience enjoyed the correction and the manner in which Lloyd George had emphasized it. Clemenceau arose, acknowledged the compliment and gave his audience physical evidence of the correctness of Lloyd George's facetious description.

The Supreme War Council, with M. Pichon presiding and an interpreter on each side of him, met in a small room at the Quai d'Orsay. There were no formalities. There was no table in front of the members of the Council, except a pulpit-type of desk at which M. Pichon sat on an elevated chair. Signor Orlando, Signor Sonnino, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Balfour and the other members discussed the questions presented, in the most informal way. President Wilson did not speak French. M. Clemencean. spoke very good English but more often used French. Here were the men, with their associates, who were to determine the peace conditions for which the world had been waiting. Usually they rested at five o'clock, and took tea in an adjoining room, allowing opportunity for personal talks. I had the pleasure of meeting them all, on such occasions.

At one of the meetings, I asked Clemenceau if he would autograph his photograph for me. He said he would be glad to do so; so later I sent Barber, who spoke French fluently, to the French Premier with a photograph I had purchased. Upon entering Clemenceau's office, his assistant presented Barber to Clemenceau, saying that Barber had brought the photograph which he had promised to autograph for Mr. Hurley. Clemenceau looked at it critically and said, "No, I will not sign that." Barber was a bit shocked and embarrassed, but only for a moment. The Premier turned to his secretary and said, "I don't like this photograph. It is not a good one." He then directed his assistant to go to a certain gallery and obtain his most recent picture, saying that he wanted Mr. Hurley to have the very latest. He autographed and sent it to me. While it is difficult to discover any material difference between the two photographs, both of which I have, I prize more highly the one he autographed. With his many cares and responsibilities this octogenarian was anxious to autograph only his favorite photograph for me. I was much impressed with Clemenceau. His manner of presenting his views was rugged, forceful, and at times abrupt in its frankness. Unless one were accustomed to this characteristic, it might have been thought that he was angry; but, back of this mannerism was a gentleness most charming.

It is not my purpose to review the proceedings of the six weary months during which the Peace Conference studied conditions that should be embodied in the Treaty of Peace. I desire merely to outline the part contributed by Shipping Board officials to aid the President in deciding maritime questions. There were endless meetings of councils and technical commissions of all kinds, first under direct authority of the Council of Ten and later under the Council of Four. As technical shipping adviser to the President, I was called upon to attend some of the sessions of the Council of Ten. When I sailed for the United States, in February, 1919, Henry M. Robinson was appointed to fill my place. He remained in Paris about six months, returning to the United States in the following June. At the inception of his work abroad, Robinson was designated as a special commissioner of the Shipping Board. President Wilson recognized Robinson's great ability and consulted him frequently in Paris on shipping and other important matters. In recognition of his valuable service, the President named him as a full commissioner of the Board, and his nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 18, 1919. He succeeded Commissioner Page, and resigned September 15, 1919, because of the pressure of his long-neglected personal affairs.


Invaluable aid was given to both Robinson and me by Admiral William S. Benson, Chief of Naval Operations. He had been assigned to Paris in a dual capacity, as naval adviser of the Peace mission and as the directing officer of many varied duties assumed by the Navy, from the surrender of the German naval fleet to its scuttling in Scapa Flow. His judgment was relied upon by members of the Allied Naval Council, the American Peace Commission, the Food Administration and other agencies of relief that required naval assistance. He was decorated by all the leading countries, including his own.

Although the smaller nations were supposed to assist in framing a Peace Treaty internationally acceptable, the four great powers---United States, Great Britain, France and Italy---brooked no interference in deciding important questions. From the first, it was understood that the Public Plenary Conference, at which all powers were represented, would be permitted to do little more than ratify decisions arrived at by the four great powers. It held only six meetings. The Council of Ten (merely an extension of the Supreme War Council) was the main organ of the Peace Conference. It unsuccessfully tried to keep its proceedings secret.(52) It could not stand the glare of publicity; and was so unwieldy a body that it could not arrive at decisions with the rapidity demanded by public opinion. Hence, it gave place in March, 1919, to the Council of Four, composed of Wilson, Clemenceau, Orlando and Lloyd George, which conducted meetings in secret. Clemenceau had been elected President of the Plenary Conference. He construed that this position entitled him to preside, without question, over the meetings of the Council of Ten and also of the Council of Four. What occurred when the Council of Four met had been revealed in part by Ray Stannard Baker in his book "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement." Evidently Mr. Baker had access to the minutes of the Council. A few outsiders-experts, like Robinson, were summoned now and then to give their opinion on a technical question; but they caught no more than a fleeting glimpse of the "Big Four" in action. Robinson tells me that when he was called to attend meetings of the "Big Four" in President Wilson's rooms, each statesman sat in a corner and usually spoke in the most carefully weighed sentences. Occasionally Lloyd George would enliven the proceedings with some temperamental outburst and Clemenceau would do likewise with some of his characteristic paradoxes or cynicisms.


All of President Wilson's decisions on shipping, at the Peace Conference, of necessity were influenced by his conception of what a League of Nations should be and how it should operate. In his words, it was to be "a league that can be used for cooperation in an international matter." Not fully understanding the important work that some of the inter-allied bodies had been doing, the President refused to regard them as the nucleus of his League of Nations. At first he even wanted to withdraw the American representatives from the Allied Maritime Transport Council. But he changed that attitude when he began to appreciate, at its true worth, the real significance of the Council. The Council's proceedings afforded practically the most convincing evidence that could be desired, of the possibility of international cooperation. More than any other inter-allied body that had been established during the war, it deserved to be regarded as the embryo of a League of Nations.

Just what kind of a body should administer the economic affairs of Europe during the period of the armistice was not clear in the President's mind. Long before he sailed for France, Allied statesmen had concluded that whether or not a League of Nations would be created, some agency would have to coordinate existing economic bodies during the armistice period.(53) Stevens and Rublee, our American delegates on the Allied Maritime Transport Council, were in favor of an international economic body. Their views carried great weight with me. I laid before the President the plan of such a body, arguing that it would serve only during the period of the armistice and that without it there would be some difficulty in controlling economic tendencies already beginning to manifest themselves among the Allies and in Germany, and boding no good to the League of Nations. At the session of the Council of Ten, February 10, 1919, President Wilson moved that the Supreme Economic Council be formed and authorized to operate only for the period of the armistice.

Thus the Supreme Economic Council was called into being. It united the activities of the Allied Maritime Transport Council and its programs committees, the Inter-Allied Food Council, the Supreme, Council of Supply and Relief and the Superior Blockade Council. It was made up of civilians, representing each of the five great powers. The policy-deciding body thus constituted was to deal with "such questions as food, blockade control, shipping and raw materials."

With the exception of the Americans, the members of the Supreme Economic Council were much the same as those of the Allied Maritime Transport Council. I was appointed president of the Shipping Section, but because I was needed at home, Henry M. Robinson was delegated by the President to represent the Shipping Board. Many great American business men who had won new laurels for themselves during the war were made members of the Supreme Economic Council. Bernard M. Baruch was appointed president of the Raw Material Section; Vance C. McCormick, president of the Blockade Section; Norman H. Davis, president of the Finance Section, and Herbert Hoover, president of the Food Section. Lord Robert Cecil, a, strong believer in the League of Nations, became its chairman. The bulk of the Council's work related chiefly to the relief of the famine-stricken countries of Europe and to the revictualing of Germany, in accordance with the terms of the armistice as revised at Treves and Brussels.


Because of her merciless submarine policy, the Council of Four determined to strip Germany of her shipping and to give her credit for it on the reparations account. President Wilson alone advocated a more lenient policy. It wag the opinion of the American experts at Paris that it would be economic folly to deprive Germany of her one means of paying indemnities---her export trade. But Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando, representatives of nations that had suffered far more than we had from the depredations of German submarines, knew that they could not save their political heads if they adopted the more practical American view. There had been wholesale destruction of British, French and Italian ships; and for each ton sunk, a German ton was expected. It was decided at first that Germany must give up all of her ships of 1600 gross tons and over. Drastic as was this decision it later was made even more drastic by the inclusion of such smaller craft as fishing and river boats, and by demanding the construction of new tonnage because there were not enough German ships to make good all the Allied losses.(54)

Following a recommendation of a sub-commission on reparations, the Council of Four (President Wilson excepted) favored pooling the German ships and apportioning them pro rata according to the losses sustained, including all ships still in German ports and all interned before the war by the United States and neutral countries. The proposed pooling would have given to the United States less than 4 per cent. of all German tonnage, to. Great Britain about 74 per cent., to France about 8 per cent. and to Italy about 8 per cent. Such a distribution obviously was to the advantage of the British. They were willing to exclude from the pooling only the ships that had been passed upon by prize courts. But since no ships had thus been passed upon by any country except Great Britain and Portugal, the proposal fell on deaf ears. Plausibly enough, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando argued that the German ships which the Shipping Board had seized had sought refuge in our ports at a time when the United States was neutral, and that the ships were in no better position than those interned in ports of neutral countries. Lloyd George vigorously fought Wilson on this issue. He frankly stated that it would be easier for him to justify in Parliament an American demand for pensions, than for the retention of seized German tonnage(55) We had proclaimed to all the world that we would not demand punitive damages from Germany, and that we would content ourselves with the mere payment for what had been ruthlessly and illegally destroyed. Yet here we were, refusing to give up German ships which had fled to our ports at a time when we still were neutral. In fact, we had by far the largest number of German passenger ships, and no large passenger ships had been built by any nation during the war. All our efforts had been directed to the building of cargo-ships. Our claim on these ships was morally questionable, it was asserted, because of our grandiose dreams of a maritime future. Congress had legislated the title to the ships in the United States, and the President refused to give them up.

Lloyd George advocated pooling, with an engagingly naive effrontery. The ships in our ports and in neutral countries would be more useful to Great Britain than to the United States .(56) From the outset, I had taken the position that the United States should retain these ships, and had so advised the President. Just before my departure from Paris, I had another conference with the President in which I urged again my position in the matter. I told him I felt sure that public sentiment in the United States never would countenance the surrender of those vessels. He replied in that calm but firm manner which characterized his attitude when he finally reached a decision, "Have no fears, Hurley. If we do nothing else here, we will retain those ships."

Eventually President Wilson won the issue. We kept the ships that we had seized and had repaired at enormous expense. A compromise was reached which satisfied British public opinion. Each power was pledged to pay into. the reparations fund the value of all German tonnage received in excess of war losses, so that a financial pooling arrangement was made. We kept the German ships that we had seized, but the chief gainers (apart from Great Britain) were such neutrals as Brazil and Portugal, which before the war had no merchant shipping worth mentioning.

Both Lloyd George and Clemenceau were anything but pleased with President Wilson, because at that time there was a tremendous demand for ships and no

possibility of obtaining them speedily, even for cash. In retaliation, Lloyd George and Clemenceau joined forces in defeating the President's proposal that Germany be allowed to retain temporarily part of her new fleet, then under construction, so that she might have some time to struggle to her economic feet.

The treaty which was ultimately signed compelled Germany to recognize the right of her erstwhile enemies to a replacement of all lost tonnage, ton for ton and class for class. She had to cede all her merchant ships of 1600 gross tons and more, half of her ships from 1000 to 1600 tons and a quarter of the tonnage of her steam trawlers and fishing boats. The total amount of tonnage in existence at the end of the war being much less than that sunk by German submarines, Germany was compelled to build vessels in her yards under conditions laid down by the Reparation Commission, not more than 200,000 tons a year to be delivered yearly for five years after the signing of the treaty.(57) She also was forced to surrender all ships which during the war had been transferred or were in process of transfer to neutral flags without the consent of the Allied and associated governments. The only payments allowed were those provided for under the Treves and subsequent armistice agreements, and those dealt entirely with the use of German ships for food relief.

Had the treaty been negotiated late in 1920, probably its shipping provisions would have been very different. During the first half of 1919, there was a crying demand for ships. Later, Great Britain did not know what to do with the ships she had acquired, inasmuch as her own were idly tugging at their anchors. President Wilson cherished the thought, as most of us did at home, that the huge fleet of cargo-carriers we had built would enable us to compete successfully on the high seas with European maritime nations. Early in 1919 we might have sold at high prices many ships that later rusted and rotted at their moorings. Had we done so, my successors in the Shipping Board and Fleet Corporation would have been spared much galling and unjust criticism. The President and I felt that public opinion in America would not brook the selling of our ships. The Shipping Board as a whole certainly was opposed to a sale. The almost hysterical pleas for ships, which poured in, strengthened the President and the Board in this conviction. If Europe could use our ships, why could not the United States use them? Two, years later (1921-1922) both Europe and America were made to realize, by economic facts, that war-built ships were "white elephants." We had too many of them. Nobody wanted them.





IN CLOSING this volume I desire to make acknowledgment, inadequate though it may be, of the helpful cooperation, the careful guidance and the wise counsel which President Wilson always accorded to me and my associates in the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation in our efforts to build and operate ships.

In view of the conditions which prevailed during the war, I feel justified in taking pride in the achievement of these two organizations---pride not only in their achievement but also in the loyal devotion to duty and the patriotism of those who wrought it---pride in the fact that it was wrought under the inspiring leadership of Woodrow Wilson. He once told me that as a lad he had wished he might go to sea, visit all the ports of the world and perhaps become a great sea captain; that he always had liked to watch ships, their sails bulging, cutting along the water, driven by the wind; and that he was fascinated by pictures of great vessels riding the billowy waves with their flags and pennants flying. But it was not alone his boyish enthusiasm and a vision of "a painted ship upon a painted ocean" that prompted his great interest in our task. It was his keen knowledge and thorough understanding of the vital need of ships to assist in winning the war.

When I realize that this necessity, important as it was, constituted only one of the multitude of purposes involved in his many duties and obligations, I marvel at his almost super-human ability to assimilate them into one monumental effort to accomplish the thing he sought---the thing which the country desired.

Because it was necessary to make the Shipping Board an instrumentality of war, Congress extended to the President almost unlimited powers. The authority thus granted to him the President delegated to the Shipping Board and the Emergency Fleet Corporation. This delegation of authority did not mean a shifting of his responsibility. It rather was a transfer of the physical performance of obligations involved. My duties brought me into close contact with him, and gave me a clear insight into the workings of his great mind. Because he desired to know, as it was his right to know, I kept him advised of all of our major operations. No matter what burden lay upon him at the moment, I found him ready and anxious to give his aid in assisting us to solve our problems. His desire always was to know the facts---all the facts---and upon his methodical and systematic analysis of them he based his conclusions and fixed his determinations. His grasp of intricate questions was remarkable. He quickly would comprehend a situation and make a decision without delay. His promptness in taking action after a problem had been submitted to him gave great impetus to our work. He was the great driving force of the Government, and held tightly the reins of every branch of the service, thus making it possible for each to function effectively. When he had formed a conclusion he would move straight ahead toward his goal. He would not be swerved. In his own appraisement, he characterized this attitude as stubbornness; but instead it was resoluteness.

I called upon him one day in Paris just after he had concluded a conference with Signor Sonnino, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who. spoke English fluently. Sonnino was physically a large man, and possessed a forceful character. He had a striking manner of emphasizing his opinions. His attitude often gave the President not a little concern. Sonnino was leaving the room as I entered. The argument he and the President had just ended evidently was on the President's mind. He greeted me: "Hurley, that fellow Sonnino is more stubborn than I am."

Personal feeling contrary to his reasoning and judgment rarely influenced President Wilson in his decisions. When I decided to ask his endorsement of the appointment of Schwab as Director-General of the Fleet Corporation, I was fully conscious that probably they two never had anything in common. I thought also that he would be no more than human if he entertained dislike for a man who had done as much as Schwab was said to, have done to prevent his reelection to the Presidency. When I stated my case and he realized the advantages of having a man of Schwab's standing, capabilities and personality connected with our organization, he was delighted to have Schwab join us, and readily gave his consent to the appointment.

I never had a talk with Woodrow Wilson that did not reveal some intensely human and sympathetic phase of his character. I remember accompanying him and Mrs. Wilson to the launching of the Quistconck, the first ship to slide down the ways at Hog Island Yard. The day was extremely hot. We sat on the rear platform of his private car. While going slowly through the freight yards, we passed a number of men working on the tracks under the broiling sun. He turned the conversation to a discussion of problems of the workingman, and said, "Hurley, these are the people who need to be helped. If I am able to ameliorate their condition I shall feel that my public services have not been wholly in vain."

Joseph P. Tumulty was the weather-vane of the Wilson administration. He occupied a commanding position. With his quick faculties of perception, he easily was able to sense the sentiment of the country. If the Tumulty weather-vane pointed in one direction it indicated that the political atmosphere was favorable. If it pointed in another direction it was evidence of an approaching storm. Those whose interests centred about the White House, even the President and members of the Cabinet and heads of war activities, recognized that Tumulty had a very comprehensive appreciation of the manner in which the public accepted a situation. He seemed to understand the state of mind of the people. When some newspaper story was published criticising any department of the administration, the head of such department always felt relieved if the White House weather-vane indicated that the public did not endorse the criticism. When the reaction was unfavorable to the administration, he seemed to be able to sense it quicker than any one else.

As I have said, the President always was anxious to get the facts. At times, he received much unsolicited advice. He listened and formed his own conclusions. Much of the advice he is reported to have received was of an imaginary character. Many visitors who are accorded audience with the President are anxious to have that fact heralded to the country. They desire the impression to be created that they "told the President what he ought to do," and that he was very favorably impressed. It often requires only a handshake and a cordial "how-do-you-do" to form the basis of an elaborate boast on the part of a White House caller as to what transpired between the President and him. One day while I was sitting in Tumulty's office there entered a prominent political leader from the West. An appointment had been made for him, principally to enable him to pay his respects to the Chief Magistrate. After waiting for his turn this man was ushered into the President's room, where he remained about three minutes. That evening I saw him with a group of friends from his own state. With an assumed modesty, and making an effort to have his hearers believe that he was imparting something confidential to them, he was relating in elaborate detail the things he said he had told the President. I gathered from his statements that he had advised how the war should be conducted, what was the feeling in the country, how the President should meet it and what should be the recommendations to Congress. Evidently, from his remarks, he also had imparted a vast amount of other information that would have consumed at least half an hour of the President's time. I had seen him enter the President's room and had noted his departure. The elapsed time was little more than enough to embrace an interview consisting of "glad to see you" and "good-bye."

When I hear or read of similar stories of White House callers discussing subjects with the President, privately or in meetings, of doing all the talking, and of endeavoring to create the impression that they had familiarly slapped the President on the back, I am reminded of this incident and I discount them accordingly.

The weekly meetings of the War Cabinet were like conferences of executives of large corporations reporting progress of their work to their president and submitting ways and means to carry on further. I never knew what prompted the President to form the War Cabinet, but its achievements proved that he had a keen grasp of how to organize a combined war and economic body of men for a great emergency. In the thirty years of my business career, I never had been associated with a group of men who worked together so harmoniously and effectively. Each man had a super-task to perform. McAdoo had finance and railroads, Baker had war, Daniels had navy, Baruch had the war industries, Hoover the food, Garfield the coal and oil, McCormick the exports and imports, and I had shipping and ship-building---all interwoven with each other and directly affecting the daily lives of our people at home as well as the peoples in most of the countries of Europe.

The many questions that were discussed with the President at our meetings were acted on promptly by him in a business-like manner. He never hesitated to assume full responsibility verbally or by letter in any matter on which he was asked for an opinion. Moreover, he showed his remarkable knowledge of our business problems, making many valuable suggestions that were most helpful. He seemed to have an uncanny grasp of what the people of the country would think of some new war policy in which he was to ask them to make further sacrifices, and they always confirmed his faith in them whenever he made an appeal for their support.

When. we take into consideration the frequent changes made in administrations and war officials by Great Britain, France and the other Allies, and the trying times they experienced in struggling to create constructive and workable war organizations, I believe that our strength was in having centralized control under a Commander-in-Chief. Individually we made many mistakes under war pressure, but with the counsel and cooperation of the War Cabinet under leadership of President Wilson we were prevented from making very serious ones.

I enjoyed the War Cabinet meetings. I wish it were possible for the public to have seen how Woodrow Wilson always greeted his War Cabinet, at the weekly Wednesday meetings in his study. It was formerly the old cabinet room where Lincoln, Grant, Cleveland, McKinley and other presidents held their regular cabinet meetings before President Roosevelt built the Executive Office Building and the new Cabinet Room.


We usually met in the Red Room a few minutes before two thirty, and when all the members had arrived we went upstairs. The President always stood nearby the open door of his study and shook hands in the most cordial manner with each member as he entered, greeting us with "How are you, McCormick!" "Hello, Baruch," or some times referring casually to a letter he had received that day from one or another of our members.

The room, on the south side of the White House overlooking the Potomac, contained the President's flat-top desk, his office chair, and a few other commodious chairs but no table. It always was necessary to bring in a few extra chairs, some of them not very restful. About the first thing the President usually did was to remove the flowers from his desk and put them in some out of the way place so that he could see each of us. Then he would pass cigars to the members, and perhaps ask a member if his chair was comfortable. Quite often he would tell some amusing story, or an incident that had occurred to him, before commencing the business of the day.

When a person crosses the threshold of an Irishman's cottage he receives a hearty handshake of welcome. The first thing his host will do is to get a poker, stir up the grate or the kitchen fire and put on a bit of coal or peat. Until the fire is burning brightly the cottager feels there is a lack of cheer, and that you have not received a real Irish welcome suitable to the honor you have conferred on him by visiting him in his humble home. While the President had no fire or poker, he demonstrated to us his warm hospitality in making us all feel at home, and I often had the feeling that this cordial characteristic in him was proof of his Irish ancestry.

President Wilson was called upon to make many momentous decisions throughout the period leading up to our entrance into the war, and during our participation. Apart from his decision to ask Congress for a declaration of war against Germany, few if any were more important than the one involved in his final note to Germany. It was a decision of far-reaching consequence. The President keenly felt the responsibility that weighed upon him.

In a note that had won admiration of the country and the Allies, he had refused to consider an armistice proposal emanating from the Kaiser's Government. Then had followed a series of notes until the point was reached where it appeared that the exchange of communications was losing its effectiveness so far as the public was concerned.

There was unmistakable evidence that the end of the great struggle was approaching; and that Germany, at last beaten, was seeking to negotiate a treaty of peace under the most favorable terms she could get. Realizing the desperate plight of the Central Powers, the American public was divided in its sentiment as to whether there should be an agreement for an armistice or a demand for an unconditional surrender. The cry of "On to Berlin" had been raised by some patriotic and enthusiastic persons who considered neither the situation nor the consequences of such a decision.

When the proposal for an armistice came from the German people, President Wilson felt that it was his humanitarian duty to give to it the most careful consideration. The day he reached his decision was a Wednesday, when the War Cabinet was to meet. I knew he was eager to have the advice of his intimate counsellors, and hence on that morning I wrote him a letter suggesting that in his reply to Germany he consent to an armistice rather than demand an unconditional surrender. Although I did not know whether or not he had reached a decision, it subsequently appeared that I anticipated his own desire and intentions in the matter. When I entered his study that afternoon., to attend the War Cabinet meeting, he thanked me for my letter and said he was very grateful for my opinion, which he valued highly and with which he was in full accord.(58)

The meeting was a most solemn occasion. The President seemed to be more nervous than usual. Discussion of the subject of his reply to Germany was broached as soon as we had assembled. The President stated that he desired an expression of opinion from each one present. I was somewhat surprised when each man, with one exception, indicated his belief that the proposal for an armistice, in the form in which it had come from the German people, should be accepted by the United States. The dissenting voice came, from a member whom I least expected to be the one of us to suggest that we demand an unconditional surrender.

The President sat calm, and listened attentively to each member as he gave his opinion. The discussion that followed was general. Finally the President quietly drew from an inside pocket of his coat a typewritten memorandum. "Gentlemen," he said, "I have here the tentative draft of a note that I think I should send to Germany. I should like to read it, and since it is the consensus of your opinion that we should accept the proposal for an armistice., I shall be happy to receive your suggestions regarding any changes that you think should be made in the document." His utterances were slow and deliberate. He paused momentarily at the conclusion of each sentence, to enable his auditors to absorb its full significance. Not a man present failed to realize that in that note Woodrow Wilson had written a declaration that would end the great World War.

When he had concluded, the President laid the typewritten sheet upon the table before him, and asked for suggestions for its improvement. I was enthusiastic over the character of the note, and so expressed myself. Others were equally warm in their endorsement. One member, however, suggested that while as a whole he would approve the contents of the note, at the same time he believed it would be more helpful from a political standpoint if a certain change were made in one expression. The President shook his head in a most impressive manner. "No," he said decisively, "I am dealing in human lives---not in politics.

No one was able to offer a suggestion that we believed would improve the message. Not a word of it was changed from the form in which the President had drafted it. Realizing its tremendous importance, we believed that not only the people of America, but the nations of the world would applaud him for the masterly way in which he had presented the views of the United States and the Allies. When we left the White House that afternoon all of us knew that we had participated in a meeting of great historic importance; and we felt highly privileged to be associated with this wise and far-seeing statesman.

I cannot divest myself of the conviction that political considerations were largely responsible for some of the more important Senate reservations to the covenant of the League of Nations in the Treaty of Versailles.

The President had the impression that Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, then Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, was solely responsible for the reservations to the covenant. There is good authority, however, for the statement that another Republican Senator, whom Lodge knew to be sympathetic toward the League of Nations and who desired the ratification of the Treaty, actually suggested the reservations that Senator Lodge adopted and subsequently sponsored as his own. There was an intense feeling of bitterness between the President and the Senator from Massachusetts. No doubt it bad something to do with the President's firm decision to insist upon the ratification of the Treaty with terms of the covenant unimpaired.

Undoubtedly there were Senators, both Republicans and Democrats, who entertained conscientious objections to certain provisions of the Treaty. But, however strong those objections may have been, political considerations were more numerous. The feeling of some of the President's opponents in the Senate was so bitter that they were willing to go to great lengths to embarrass him. This was evident from the character of the attacks that repeatedly were made upon him. When he declined to accept the reservations, they saw in his attitude an opportunity to create an issue that they hoped would redound to their advantage. Subsequent events proved that it did.

In March, 1920, I was one of a group of the President's most intimate friends and supporters, who met at his request one Sunday evening in the Chevy Chase Club near Washington, for the purpose of discussing the existing political situation with particular reference to the Peace Treaty then before the Senate for the second time. Among those present were Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, leader of the fight in the Senate for ratification of the treaty; Bainbridge Colby, previously one of the Shipping Board Commissioners and then Secretary of State; Senator Carter Glass of Virginia; David F. Houston, Secretary of the Treasury; Bernard M. Baruch, William B. Wilson, Secretary of Labor; Albert S. Burleson, Postmaster General; Joseph P. Tumulty, Secretary to the President, and a few others. Homer S. Cummings, who then was Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, presided at the dinner and at its conclusion produced a personal memorandum in the President's handwriting in which was asked, "What shall I do politically this year?"

Cummings expressed his belief that the President was desirous of being renominated a at the forthcoming National Convention in San Francisco. This of course was merely a deduction on the part of Cummings. It was shared by many of those present. Burleson declared, without reservation, that the President should be renominated. Others of us, however, who were quite as loyal to the President and equally sincere in our support of him and his policies, felt that in view of his physical condition due to the terrific strain under which he had labored for the previous two years, it would not be fair to permit him to become a candidate for a third term. We felt that he could not endure the struggle involved in another campaign and that he was not able to fulfill the arduous duties of four more years in the White House. Those of us who knew just what was his condition expressed the fear that renomination would shorten his life. Without having made any attempt to agree among ourselves regarding the nomination of some one as his successor, we turned the discussion to what promised to be, and subsequently was, the main issue of the campaign that year---namely, the Senate reservations and amendments to the Peace Treaty.

In this connection, a letter was read from the late Frank I. Cobb, editor of the New York World, one of the President's warmest admirers and supporters. It was a wonderful letter, written in that forceful and convincing style always characteristic of Cobb's editorials in the World. It was an argument strongly urging that the President accept the reservations recommended by the Senate Committee. Senator Hitchcock, who was ably conducting the fight in behalf of the treaty and the covenant in the exact forms in which the President submitted them to the Senate, stated that he was in agreement with the position taken by Cobb. He said that while he favored the treaty and the covenant in their original forms, and was willing to carry on the struggle to the end if it were necessary to do so,, he felt that there were many reasons why the reservations should be accepted. This was his view particularly because he realized that it would not be possible to induce the Senate to ratify the treaty without the reservations. A very careful canvass of the situation in the Senate had convinced him that the effort to have the treaty ratified could not succeed without certain reservations to the covenant.

Practically every one present concurred with Senator Hitchcock, and thought that the best interests of the party would be served if the President were to yield his opposition to the reservations. We all were practical men and real friends of the President, and some of those present much preferred to have the treaty ratified without changes. But we realized that because it had become a political issue, this could not be done. Also, we believed that the really worth while accomplishment was the ratification of the treaty with the covenant included and that the objectionable reservations would not seriously impair its value or its effectiveness.

When we had come to the point of agreement on this matter, Senator Glass remarked: "Well, I think we are all of one opinion, which is that the President should accept the reservations and be advised that this is our recommendation. But,"---and here he hesitated. Every one else eagerly waited, to learn what might be his objection. "But," he continued, "I would like, to know, in the present condition. of the President's mind and his state of health, who among us will be willing to go to him and tell him that he should accept the reservations."

There was a hush. Each one waited for some one else to accept the invitation. There was no volunteer.

* * * * * * *

My last day on the Shipping Board was July 31, 1919. I called at the White House to bid the President good-bye. For days he had been discussing with members of the Senate and others the various phases of the covenant of the League of Nations and the Peace Treaty. As I was ushered into his office I saw that he appeared worn and haggard. He shook hands with me and said, "Hurley, I have just been talking to some more Senators about the Peace Treaty," and then rather sadly he added, "They are endeavoring to humiliate me." The tone of his voice indicated to me., for the first time since I had known him, that he realized he was on the defensive. His trips to France and the enormous responsibility he had assumed at the Peace Conference had made a telling effect upon him. He no longer was the aggressive Woodrow Wilson I previously had known. The pressure to which he had been subjected by representatives of the European nations at the Conference, who were grinding their own political axes and seeking to obtain what each regarded as his share of the liberated territory and the reparations to be paid, was very exasperating to, a man of Wilson's fine sensibilities and ideals. Upon returning home he had found an organized effort to discredit his great work in the interests of world peace. I could see that he was disheartened, and that the terrible ordeal had affected his health.

He expressed his regret that I was leaving, and thanked me for my efforts during the war. I earnestly urged him not to make his proposed trip to the West; but he said, "Hurley, I feel it is my duty to explain my views and my position to the people, and I believe they will accept them. If they do not, I shall have the satisfaction of knowing that I did the best I could."



[*Note: This letter was referred to Mr. Hurley by Secretary Lansing.]

Department of State, August 21, 1917.

Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
6993, August 21, 4 p.m.

I have received the following personal and private letter which I quote in full:

My dear Ambassador:

When I was in the United States the question was raised as to whether the shipping under construction in American yards on British account should be taken over by the American Government or should remain in the ownership of the country for which it was being built. Mr. Denman at that time head of the Shipping Board raised this point in the course of a conference at which both he and General Goethals were present, which the British Government had adopted; his line of argument being that British orders occupied all the yards of the United States, that American labor and American capital were absorbed in the construction of British shipping, and that with their assistance Britain would find herself at the end of the war possessed of a great mercantile marine which the United States had built but did not own.

I took the liberty of pointing out to Mr. Denman in reply that in ordering these ships before America entered the War, Great Britain took the only course open to her and one which, however the question of ownership was ultimately decided, must be to the advantage of all the powers fighting against Germany. It was of the first necessity that the whole of the world's resources in ship-building open to the Allies should be used in the construction of mercantile ships and as America was not then among the Belligerents, it was only by the British Government that the necessary arrangements could at that time be made with private owners of shipyards in the United States. I added that under no circumstances would the British Government enter into controversy with the State Department on the question of ownership and that we placed complete reliance upon the justice and good will of the authorities in Washington. To this policy we still adhere. If the United States Government after surveying all the circumstances of the case think the ships that we have ordered in their yards should belong to them, we shall not think of making any protest nor are we of the opinion that if the ships on completion are used in the war work of the Allies the question of ownership has any material bearing upon the conduct of the war. It may, however, be worth observing that if our own policy toward our Allies were taken as a precedent there would be no change of ownership in the case of the British ships now under construction in American yards. We always drew a sharp distinction between ships building for Allies in our yards and ships building for neutrals. The latter were brought under the British flag and retained in Allied services for the period of the war, work on the former was dealt with exactly as if the ships were being built for British owners and when finished they were handed over without reserve to the country on whose account they were ordered. There was as far as I can ascertain only one exception to this general practice and in this particular case satisfactory arrangements were made. From every nature of the case the largest losses in mercantile shipping have been borne by Great Britain. It is on Great Britain in the main that the Allies have relied for the maintenance of the sea-borne traffic on which not merely their capacity for fighting but their very existence depends. It is on Great Britain that the full brunt of the submarine campaign has fallen. Our losses have been heavy and unless we obtain the ships now under construction for us in America we cannot easily tide over the critical period which must elapse before our own extended ship-building program bears its full fruit.

We should therefore feel much gratified if the United States Government thought it consistent with the claims of their own national interest to allow the ships now building for us in America to remain in their present ownership, though for the reasons given above we shall not press the point. We rely (as I said in Washington) on their justice and good will.

Yours sincerely,






August 29, 1917,

To the Honorable,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of August 23d, enclosing a copy of the dispatch from our Embassy at London quoting a personal letter from Mr. Balfour to Mr. Page. I note all that Mr. Balfour says regarding the British ships now in our yards with the deepest interest. I need hardly tell you that this matter has had most careful consideration.

It has not been with any view to national advantage, but with the single-minded purpose of waging the war successfully that my own personal thought has been given to this matter. On account of the uncertainty of the amount of tonnage we may require for our troops in France, my views are that we must move slowly. Our line of communication to our troops in France extends over the Atlantic Ocean. It is our first duty, not only to ourselves but to the nations associated with the United States in the war against the German Government, to see to it that every precaution is taken to preserve these lines of communication.

The American Government will be held responsible for the maintenance of its own fighting forces in France. It must not only have adequate transport facilities for troops, but must always have at hand a sufficient number of ships for the movement of supplies for the maintenance of these troops, as well as for the needs of the nations associated with us. The responsibility for this vital war service falls upon us. We cannot shirk the responsibility, or share it.

If we could calculate the measure of destruction of merchant shipping by submarines in the future, we would have greater freedom of action in this matter, but as the future must be guessed, rather, than gauged, it seems to me that we would assume grave risks in adopting any policy which would reduce our control of our own military and naval situation, without reducing our responsibility.

For your information, I will say that the Steamship War Sword owned by the Cunard Line and now in San Francisco, which came under our commandeering order, has been turned over to the Cunard Company. This ship was ordered and paid for by the Cunard Company and I understand no money was due when the commandeering order went into effect and the ship was about ready to sail.

You will appreciate the uncertainty of our requirements on the other side at the present time, as well as in the future. We are figuring on sending thousands of tons of freight cars, locomotives, hospital trains, rails, ties, thousands of feet of lumber and many other materials for construction of which it is impossible at the moment to gather complete data. In addition, the Army must be provided with transport, supplies for the Army, animals, munitions and food. For the sending of troops and supplies for our own men we can arrive at an approximation, but even this approximation is again made tentative by the degree of destructiveness in future submarine operations.

No one can predict with certainty or accuracy what demands will be made upon us in the future. The uncertainty of the entire situation is such that we should move cautiously with the thought always in mind of living up to our promises to our own people and to the nations associated with us. Our first thought, of course, must be for our own troops, and we must take every precaution to see that we are able to meet their requirements abundantly even at a time when we may have a million or two million men in France.

If we were to act hurriedly and turn over the tonnage of all foreign countries now in our yards, and later the submarine menace should increase, and thus decrease our present tonnage and proposed tonnage to a point where we could not supply our own soldiers, or even delay the sending of such supplies, we would be placed in the position of having failed to use the good judgment which the American people expect us to use. The very labor used in the construction of these ships would have a right to complain that its work had not saved its brothers in the trenches from the disaster that would come from a failure of supplies.

In view of all the facts, it is my hope that the British Government will appreciate the seriousness of our position and realize that the transportation of troops 3000 miles is a serious task; that our ships must sail 6000 miles in order to carry a cargo; that this is the longest line of communication which any nation in war has-ever been compelled to maintain; that while they have suffered severely by the submarine and we recognize the point of view set forth in all friendliness, our own necessities require us to move with caution and care.

They may rest assured that the tonnage in our yards that we may from time to time take over, if conditions demand it, will be in the service of our Army in France, as well as in the service of the nations associated with us in the war.

The American people have been most generous in giving every branch of our Government unlimited powers not only in supplying our Government sufficient funds but in being -ready and willing to continue financing our associates in the war. The American people, in turn, expect us to pay special attention to our soldiers who are to fight our battles thousands of miles from home, and any steps taken whereby these men are not first considered, to my mind, would meet with the general disapproval of the American people.

Yours very truly,





October 23, 1918.

My dear Mr. President:

It is a little outside my bailiwick, but I can't help feeling that it is vital not merely to the people of the United States, but to the people of the world that the throttle of war and peace should remain in your hands. I know so well the spirit of some of our friends on the other side---the leaders whose chief thought is their own prestige and power---that I dread the consequences if, in the maneuvering that may take place, they should succeed in assuming the direction of future negotiations.

I think that it is because they have had this end in view that they have flooded the cables with inspired articles from British Army Headquarters and yet have suppressed information showing the real feeling of the mass of people in England.

Not much importance can be attached to the editorial comments here or abroad. I have noticed that your policies, even those which were not acclaimed by the newspapers at the moment, have been amazingly successful, and I believe that the reason for this is that you have been close to the heart of the people; that you understand their real feeling; and that your own conscience and sense of justice have been your infallible guides.

Even those who would like to dispute your leadership do not dare to do it because they know you have had from the beginning the complete confidence of the peoples of this and all foreign countries.

Your skillful handling of the situation has had results for which few persons dared to hope a few months ago. Your notes, without a question of a doubt, have led the German people to demand a more democratic form of government. Yet the notes which have brought about this result, causing exultation everywhere, were the very notes most criticised.

It is not necessary for us to trust the German Government or recognize its professions of good faith in order to further the diplomatic progress that has been made. Even an armistice can be worked out in such a way as to be the equivalent of a complete victory in the field.

The only thing that could pull the German people together now would be the knowledge that America will not make peace on any terms; that they want to continue the war for war's sake.

I doubt whether we will have much cooperation at any time from the leaders on the other side; but the people over there, as well as here, are with you heart and soul. If the time arrives when you see fit to submit any proposals to the Allies, and you submit them publicly, I am inclined to think that the people of France and England will prevent any incontinent rejection by the politicians.

The only opposition you need ever anticipate here would come from the editorial writers and the politicians. The people are with you because they know you are disinterested; because they know you have their welfare at heart. That is why they followed you into war, and that is why they will follow you out of it. The spirit of America, I believe, would give a million lives for justice, but not a single life for vengeance.

Faithfully yours,


The President,
The White House.



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Abbott, Mr.
Ackerson, Com. John L.
Ackerman, F. E.
Adams, Herbert
Adams, Lieut. Samuel H.
Alexander, Charles B.
Alexander, Joshua W.
Amberg, Harold V.
Anderson, John
Arnold, Bion J.
Atterbury, General W. W
Attolico, Prof. Bernardo

Bacon, Daniel
Bailey, Mr.
Bakenhus, Com. Reuben E.
Baker, Bernard N.
Baker, Lieut.-Com. George Barr
Baker, Ray Stannard
Baker, Secretary of War
Baldwin, James L.
Balfour, Rt. Hon. Arthur J.
Barber, J. E.
Barnes, of British Cabinet
Barney, Morgan
Baruch, B. M.
Bass, Robert P.
Beale, Sir John
Beauley, William J.
Belknap, Commander Charles
Benda, W. T.
Benson, Admiral W. S.
Berres, A. J.
Bertholf, Mr.
Bissell, M. C. T.
Black, Maj.-Gen. William M.
Blair, Lieut.-Col. James A., Jr.
Blashfield, E. H.
Bliss, General Tasker H.
Blythe, Stuart C.
Bolling, Richard Wilmer
Booth, Sir Alfred
Bouisson, M.
Bowles, Admiral F. T.
Boyd, H. W.
Brady, Nicholas J.
Braun, von
Brent, Theodore
Brown, Lieut. L. Ames
Browning, Admiral
Brush, Matthew C.
Bulkley, Robert J.
Bull, Charles Livingston
Bunau-Varilla, M.
Burchard, Anson W.
Burling, Edward S.
Burleson, Albert S.
Burroughs, John
Burton, Dean Alfred E.

Campbell, Ira A.
Capps, Rear-Adm. W. L.
Carry, Edward F.
Carse, H. R.
Carter, Commodore A. F.
Casey, F. D.
Cecil, Lord Robert
Chamberlain, Senator G. E.
Chambers, Edward
Chambers, Captain F. T.
Charpentier, T. M.
Chubb, Hendon
Clark, Champ
Clemenceau, M. Georges
Clementel, M.
Cleveland, Grover
Coffin, Haskell
Cobb, Frank .
Cohan, George M.
Cohan, Mrs. Helen Frances
Cohen, B. V.
Colby, Bainbridge
Collins, James H.
Cook, George Crouse
Coolidge, Louis A.
Connick, Harris D. H.
Coonley, Howard
Cooper, F. G.
Cooper, Commander Spencer
Cotton, Joseph P.
Cox, Daniel H.
Creel, George
Crespi, Signor
Crowder, Gen. Enoch H.
Cummings, Homer S.
Cuno, Dr. F.
Cuthell, Chester W.

Dana, John Cotton
Dana, Professor William J.
Daniels, Secretary J.
Darling, J. N.
Daugherty, James
Davey, W. N.
Davis, Norman H.
Davis, Professor
Davison, Henry P.
Dawes, General Charles G.
Day, Charles
Dearborn, George S.
DeForest, Robert N.
Delaney, James
Denman-Goethals controversy
Denman, Wm.
Dennett, R. C.
Dennison, Henry S.
Dent, Mr.
Devitt, Sir Thomas L.
Dillman, L. M.
Dollar, Robert
Donald, John A.
Donnelly, William T.
Dow, L. H.
Doyle, Michael Francis
Drew, John
Dunn, Harvey
Dunning, Major M. B.
Dutton, C. D.

Eastwood, Professor E. .
Edison, T. A.
Eggert, Herbert S.
Ellerman, Sir John
Erzberger, Mathias
Eustis, F. A.
Ewing, David L.

Fabre, Naval Lieutenant
Falls, C. B.
Faucher, Louis
Farina, Signor
Farrell, James A.
Felton, S. M.
Ferguson, L. R.
Ferguson, W. L.
Ferris, Theodore
Fetterolf, A. C.
Field, Professor J. A.
Fillioux, Commandant
Firestone, Harvey
Flagg, James Montgomery
Flannery, J. Roger
Fletcher, Senator D. U.
Foch, Marshal
Foley, Commander Paul
Ford, Henry
Francqui, E.
Franklin, P. A. S.
Fraser and Fraser, London
Freemont, Commander J. C.
Fried, Captain George
Furness, Lord

Garfield, Dr. Harry A.
Gay, Dean Edwin P.
Geddes, Sir Eric
George, Lloyd
Getz, Colonel George F.
Gibbs, William Francis
Gibson, Charles Dana
Gibson, Edward
Gibson, Hugh
Gilbert, Cass
Giles, H.
Giusti, Commander Mario
Glass, Senator Carter
Gleaves, Rear-Admiral Albert
Goethals, General
Goldwise, Charles
Gompers, Samuel
Goodenough, Walter
Goodhue, Charles
Gordon, J. R.
Gough, General Sir Hubert
Grant, President
Gray, Carl R.
Greene, J. D.
Griffin, John W.
Grover, Henry C.
Guthrie, Sir Connop

Haig, General
Hamilton, Robert E.
Harding, Senator Warren G.
Harbord, General James G.
Harlan, John Maynard
Harriman, Averill
Harris, Rear-Adm. Frederic R.
Hayes, Sir Bertram
Hedge, W. R.
Heineken, Philip
Heinl, Robert D.
Heinz, Howard, .
Henderson, Gerard C.
Heyworth, James .
Hibberd, Captain I. N.
Hines, Brig.-Gen. Frank T.
Hindenburg, Field Marshal, von
Hitchcock, Sen. Gilbert M.
Hodgson, Captain A. C.
Hoffman, Malvina
Hog Island
Holbrook, Frederick
Holl, Julius S.
Hoover, Herbert
Hope, Rear-Admiral George W.
Horn, Tom
House, Colonel E. M.
Houston, David IF.
Howard, Henry, of Boston
Hunt, A. M.
Huger, Alfred
Hughes, Premier
Hurley, Edward N.
Inberclyde, Lord

Inchcape, Lord

Jack, C. P. M.
Jackson, G. S.
Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John
Johnson, E. Eades
Johnson, Senator Hiram
Jones, Thomas D.
Joubert, F. C.
Jusserand, French Ambassador

Kerensky, Alexander F.
Keynes, J. M.
Kiehne, Captain H. H.
Kirby, Rollin
Kirlin, J. Parker
Knight, Charles
Knight, Peter .
Koo, Wellington

Lodge, T.
Lodge, Sen. Henry Cabot
Logan, Thomas F.
Logan, Colonel J. A.
Lord, Frank B.
Loucheur, M.
Love, W. J.
Lackaye, Wilton
Lamont, Thomas W.
Lansing, Sec'y R. , t
Lasker, Albert, D.
Lasteyrie, Charles de
Laurent-Vibert, P.
Laurent-Vibert, R.
Law, Mr. Bonar
Lazzarini, Captain
Lee, Louis B.
Legge, Alexander
Lewis, Sir Frederick W.
Leyendecker, J. C.
Lie, Jonas
Liggett, Louis K.
Lilly, Joseph T.
Lincoln, President
Lippmann, Walter
Little, H. H.
Livengood, W. W.
Ludendorff, von

McAdoo, Secretary W. G.
McAuliffe, Pierce J.
McConnell, I. W.
McCormick, Cyrus H., Sr.
McCormick-Goodhart, Lt.-Com.
McCormick, V. C.
McCumber, Senator P. J.
McCutcheon, John T.
McIlvaine, William B.
McKinley, President
Macauley, C. R.
Maclay, Sir Joseph
Macy, V. Everit
Maguire, M. J.
Mallory, Clifford
Manson, Mr.
March, Gen. P. C.
Marshall, Dr. L. C.
Marsillac, Jacques de
Mason, Arthur J.
Mauchan, R. B.
Max, M. Jules
Maxim, Hudson
May, Pierre
Meaux, Commandant de
Melchior, Dr.
Meriwether, W. S.
Miller, Diver
Miller, Professor Edward F.
Monnet, Jean
Monroe, H. L.
Monteagle, Lord
Morgan, Wallace
Morrow, D. W.
Muhlfeld, George .
Murphy, Col. Grayson M. P.

Nevin, John J.
Nixon, F. K.
Northcliffe, Lord
Norton, Charles D.

Obendorff, Count von
O'Connor, T. V.
Ogden, Bryan K.
Oliver, Captain Alfred
Ordway, Lucius P.
Orlando, Signor

Page, Charles R.
Page, Ambassador Walter H.
Parker, Judge E. B.
Patterson, A. M.
Pans, Herbert
Payne, John Barton
Pennell, Joseph
Percy, Lord Eustace
Pershing, General John J.
Pichon, M.
Piez, Charles
Pigott William
Pillsbury, Captain A. F.
Pirrie, Lord
Poma, Carlo
Pope, Frank W., III
Powell, T. C.
Powelson, Lieut.-Com. W. V. N.
Pratt, Captain W. V.
Prevost, Miss M. L.
Prior, Laurens N.
Pryor, Prof. F. L.

Rantzau, Doctor
Ratjen, Doctor
Raymond, H. H.
Reading, Lord
Redfield, Wm. C.
Rehak, Louis
Replogle, Leonard J.
Reuterdahl, Henry
Reynolds, D. M.
Ring, Welding
Ripley, Prof. William Z.
Roberts, Prof. James
Robinson, Dwight P.
Robinson, Henry M.
Robinson,& H. M.
Rogers, W. A.
Rogers, Will
Roosevelt, T.
Rosseter, J. H.
Rousseau, Rear-Adm. H.
Royden, Sir Thomas
Rublee, George
Ryan, John D.

Salter, Sir J. Arthur
Sadler, Prof. Herbert C.
Sanders, W. J.
Saunders, W. L.
Schock, Finner
Schwab, Charles M.
Scott, Mr.
Scott, General Hugh L.
Scott, Sir Percy
Seeliger, Geheimrat
Shaw, Prof. C. E.
Shearman, L. H.
Sheldon, L. P.
Sheridan, Frank J., Jr.
Sims, Vice-Adm. Wm.
Sinnott, Arthur J.
Smith, A. H.
Smith, George T.
Smith, Senator James, Jr.
Smith, R. A. C.
Smull, J. Barstow
Soleau, Mr.
Sonnino, Signor
Sousa, John Philip
Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil, "
Steed , Henry Wickham
Stevens, Raymond B.
Stobbia, L.
Stone, Senator
Stone, Charles A.
Sullivan, Roger C.
Sutphen, Henry R.

Taft, William Howard
Tardleu, Andre
Taylor, Dr. Alonzo B.
Taylor, A. Merritt
Theierichens, Commander
Thomas, Augustus
Thomas, J. H.
Thomas, L. .
Tirpitz, von
Tobey, B. .
Townsend, Harry
Tumulty, J. P.

Vanselow, Captain
Villa, Signor
Vose, Prof. F. H.

Ward, Dudley
Waterson, Colonel Henry
Weimar, Herr
Welsh, H. Devitt
Weymiss, Admiral Sir Rosslyn
West, Governor Oswald
Whipple, Sherman L.
White, John B.
Whitehead, Captain
Whiteside, A. D.
Wiezbicki, Lieutenant, of France
Wig, R. J.
Willemstyn, Max
Williams, C. D.
Wilson, Admiral Henry G.
Wilson, William B.
Wilson, Woodrow
Winchell, B. L.
Winterfeldt, General von
Wise, E. F.
Wood, General Leonard

Yoshida, Colonel T.
Yung, Captain

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